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ASSESSING REFUGEE PROTECTION CL AIMS AT
AUSTRALIAN AIRPORTS: THE GAP BET WEEN
L AW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE
R E G I NA J E F F E R I E S , * D A N I E L
G H E Z E L BA S H † A N D A S H E R H I R S C H ‡
Australia’s current approach to processing individuals who arrive by air and raise protection claims at or before immigration clearance at Australian airports has not been previously explored. is article reveals a set of policy and procedural instructions, recently released by the Department of Home Aﬀairs (‘DHA’) under the Freedom of Information Act
1982 (Cth), which establishes the administrative process of ‘entry screening’. e article
examines entry screening within the transnational framework governing Australia’s legal
obligations towards individuals seeking international protection. While much scholarly
and public attention has been directed towards policies such as oﬀshore detention and interdiction at sea, the documents reveal that policies designed to deter ‘unauthorised maritime arrivals’ have similar manifestations — and consequences — for ‘unauthorised air
arrivals’. e article then turns to an analysis of domestic law, arguing that the Migration
Act 1958 (Cth) does not authorise the entry screening procedures and that the procedures
contradict certain statutory guarantees and procedural fairness. e documents further indicate that DHA lacks accurate data on protection claims made in Australian airports.
Finally, the article examines why the current practice of entry screening violates Australia’s
international legal obligations of non-refoulement and non-penalisation.
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I INTRODUCTION
Despite playing a key role in the development of the post-World War II international refugee law framework, in recent years Australian practice has openly
challenged well-settled international legal norms through the use of policies
meant to deter individuals from seeking protection in Australia. While much
scholarly and public attention has been directed towards the Australian government’s attempts to create zones free of legal protections and judicial review
through the use of externalisation policies such as oﬀshore detention and interdiction at sea — essentially leveraging physical spaces away from the Australian
mainland to eﬀect policy objectives — information recently released by the Department of Home Aﬀairs (‘DHA’) in response to requests under the Freedom
of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (‘FOI Act’) 1 reveals the creation and maintenance
of similar zones on the Australian mainland.
A number of recent media reports concerning people seeking asylum at
Australian airports demonstrate Australia’s approach to people seeking asylum
by air. In February 2019, an Australian Broadcasting Corporation (‘ABC’) investigation found evidence that the Australian Border Force (‘ABF’) had turned
back at least two young Saudi Arabian women at Sydney Airport aer the

1

Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (‘FOI Act’).
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women requested asylum. 2 e ABC reported that one of the women, called
Amal, arrived at Sydney Airport in November 2017 when ABF oﬃcials became
suspicious that she intended to request asylum. 3 Aer informing Amal that she
would not be allowed to enter Australia, Amal made clear her intention to claim
asylum to oﬃcials, which the ABF apparently denied. 4 Amal was then transferred to an immigration detention centre, where she was not oﬀered a lawyer,
before being removed to South Korea (where she had boarded her flight
to Australia). 5
In November of the same year, the Guardian Australia reported that two gay
journalists from Saudi Arabia had been detained aer seeking asylum at an
Australian airport. 6 e men fled Saudi Arabia, where homosexuality is illegal
and punishable by death, aer being outed as gay by Saudi state security. According to their Australian lawyer, the men had already cleared passport control on valid tourist visas before ABF oﬃcials in customs inspected their bags
and phones and asked if they intended to apply for asylum. 7 When the men
indicated that they did intend to apply for asylum they were detained. ey
were released from detention on bridging visas in December 2019. 8 ese incidents do not appear to be isolated, though the DHA does not keep accurate
data regarding the number of individuals who have raised protection claims at
Australian airports. 9

2

3
4
5
6

7

8

9

Sophie McNeill, Sharon O’Neill and Mary Fallon, ‘Australian Border Force Accused of Targeting Women Suspected of Fleeing Saudi Arabia’, ABC News (Web Page, 5 February 2019)
<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-02-04/border-force-accused-of-targeting-saudi-womentraveling-alone/10768036>.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Helen Davidson, ‘Two Gay Saudi Journalists “Treated like Criminals” in Australia aer Seeking
Asylum’,
e
Guardian
Australia
(Web
Page,
16
November
2019)
<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/nov/16/two-gay-saudi-journaliststreated-like-criminals-in-australia-aer-seeking-asylum>.
‘Gay Saudi Journalists in Australian Detention aer Seeking Asylum’, e Sydney Morning Herald (online, 19 November 2019) <https://www.smh.com.au/world/middle-east/gay-saudijournalists-in-australian-detention-aer-seeking-asylum-20191119-p53bvu.html>.
‘Gay Saudi Couple Sultan and Nassar Released from Australian Detention’, SBS News (Web
Page, 17 December 2019) <https://www.sbs.com.au/news/gay-saudi-couple-sultan-andnassar-released-from-australian-detention>.
Department of Home Aﬀairs (Cth), Decision on Internal Review: Freedom of Information Act
1982
(ADF2019/60244,
27
May
2019)
3
(emphasis
added)
<https://www.righttoknow.org.au/request/5131/response/14847/attach/3/Decision%20letter
%20FA%2018%2011%2001551%20R1.pdf> (‘FOI Decision on Internal Review’):
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e transnational framework governing Australia’s legal obligations towards
individuals seeking international protection, like Amal and the men discussed
above, consists of a complex web of legal sources including international law,
domestic legislation, judicial decisions, administrative law, and executive
power. International law provides the footing upon which the Australian domestic protection framework rests, however imperfectly. 10 Australia’s ability to
act is underpinned by the international legal norm of non-refoulement, which
prohibits the return or removal of an individual to a place where they risk persecution or other serious harm, 11 as well as by rule of law principles such as

10

11

[R]eferrals for persons seeking to engage Australia’s protection claims are in fact recorded
in the relevant system under one of two separate codes. One of these codes is specific to
Refugee Claims, the other is for Manual Referrals/Reason Unknown. A very low number
of referrals have been recorded under the code for Refugee Claims and as there is no distinct way of determining which of the Manual referrals may have related to protection
claims, the total number of persons raising protection claims at Australia’s borders remains
undetermined.
Even the Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (Cth) 10 (emphasis added) (‘Migration and Maritime Powers Bill Explanatory Memorandum’) notes the removal of references to
certain international obligations in domestic law:
e Bill also removes most references to the Refugees Convention from the Migration Act
and instead creates a new, independent and self-contained statutory framework which articulates Australia’s interpretation of its protection obligations under the Refugees Convention.
It is not the intention of the Government to resile from Australia’s protection obligations under
the Refugees Convention but rather to codify Australia’s interpretation of these obligations
within certain sections of the Migration Act.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150
(entered into force 22 April 1954) art 33 (‘1951 Convention’); Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October
1967) art 7 (‘1967 Protocol’); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered
into force 26 June 1987) art 3 (‘CAT’); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
opened for signature 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976)
arts 6, 7 (‘ICCPR’); Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November
1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990) art 37 (‘CRC’); Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 UNTS 3 (entered
into force 3 May 2008) art 15 (‘CRPD’).
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procedural fairness. 12 While reflected in international treaties, 13 the principle
of non-refoulement also forms part of customary international law, 14 and Australian domestic law. 15 Yet successive federal governments have taken explicit
steps to weaken the application of the obligation of non-refoulement, in part by
framing full and eﬀective implementation of the obligation as being at odds
with state sovereignty. 16
Whether the Saudi cases represent a small segment of individuals removed
from Australia aer seeking asylum, or whether their stories form part of a
larger pattern of behaviour is not known. e DHA has confirmed that although ‘referrals for persons seeking to engage Australia’s protection claims are
in fact recorded’, 17 the DHA’s record keeping procedures render it impossible to
determine ‘the total number of persons raising protection claims at Australia’s
12

13

14

15

16

17

See, eg, Plaintiﬀ S10/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 246 CLR 636:
‘[T]he interests which the exercise of a power of deportation are apt to aﬀect are such as tend
to attract the protection of the principles of natural justice’: at 659 [66] (Gummow, Hayne,
Crennan and Bell JJ), citing Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 622 (Brennan J) (‘Kioa’). See also
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN Doc A/810 (10 December
1948) Preamble para 3.
1951 Convention (n 11) art 33; 1967 Protocol (n 11) art 7; CAT (n 11) art 3; ICCPR (n 11) arts
6, 7. ough not contained explicitly within the ICCPR (n 11), the obligation of non-refoulement has been considered part of the instrument: Human Rights Committee, General
Comment No 31 [80]: e Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to
the Covenant, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/REV.1/ADD.13 (26 May 2004) 5 [12].
See, eg, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (Advisory Opinion, 26 January 2007) 7 [15]
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/45f17a1a4.html>; Guy S Goodwin-Gill, ‘Non-Refoulement,
Temporary Refuge, and the “New” Asylum Seekers’ in David James Cantor and Jean-François
Durieux (eds), Refuge from Inhumanity?: War Refugees and International Humanitarian Law
(Brill Nijhoﬀ, 2014) 433, 458 (‘Non-Refoulement and Temporary Refuge’); Guy S GoodwinGill and Jane McAdam, e Refugee in International Law (Oxford University Press,
3rd ed, 2007) 354; Elihu Lauterpacht and Daniel Bethlehem, ‘e Scope and Content of the
Principle of Non-Refoulement: Opinion’ in Erika Feller, Volker Türk and Frances Nicholson
(eds), Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International
Protection (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 87, 140 [196].
See, eg, Department of Home Aﬀairs (Cth), e Administration of the Immigration Program
(Background Paper, 2nd ed, 3 April 2019) 10 [34]. But see Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 197C
(‘Migration Act’).
See generally Claire Higgins, Asylum by Boat: Origins of Australia’s Refugee Policy (NewSouth
Publishing, 2017); Daniel Ghezelbash, Refuge Lost: Asylum Law in an Interdependent World
(Cambridge University Press, 2018); Asher Lazarus Hirsch, ‘e Borders Beyond the Border:
Australia’s Extraterritorial Migration Controls’ (2017) 36(3) Refugee Survey Quarterly 48; Jennifer Hyndman and Alison Mountz, ‘Another Brick in the Wall?: Neo-Refoulement and the
Externalization of Asylum by Australia and Europe’ (2008) 43(2) Government and Opposition
249.
FOI Decision on Internal Review (n 9) 3.
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borders.’ 18 Until recently, little conclusive information was publicly available regarding the current 19 entry screening procedures for individuals seeking protection at airports on the Australian mainland. is article brings those procedures to light, while analysing their domestic and international
legal implications.
Part II of this article examines the entry screening procedures for individuals who seek protection before, or during, immigration clearance at an Australian airport. is Part defines key terms and explores the content and operation
of the policy guidance and procedural instructions. is article does not address the procedures for individuals who seek protection aer passing through
immigration clearance, as those claims are subject to a diﬀerent process. Part II
concludes with an examination of the claimed statutory basis for the policy, as
well as the legal protection framework within which the entry screening procedures are meant to operate. Part III then turns to an analysis of the various domestic legal and practical issues implicated by the entry screening process, as
well as potential bases for challenging the policy and procedures. is Part explores the right to access to counsel and the right to visa application forms
where a non-citizen is detained, as well as the lack of review of entry screening
decisions, the validity of the entry screening process under the Migration Act
1958 (Cth) (‘Migration Act’) and the practical considerations that impede an
individual’s ability to raise these claims while detained at an airport.
Part IV examines the international law implications of the entry screening
procedures, including the interplay between the entry screening procedures
and the obligation of non-refoulement as contained in various international
refugee law and human rights treaties, as well as the prohibition on state
18
19

Ibid.
Various iterations of screening protection claimants at Australian airports have been in place
since at least 2001, though the focus of those procedures appears to have been on referring
people to a protection visa process. For example, according to Department of Immigration and
Border Protection (Cth), Immigration Clearance at Airports and Seaports (MSI No 327, 10 August 2001), ‘[a]ny person arriving in Australia who claims to be a refugee or who otherwise
states that they fear return to their country of citizenship or usual residence should be interviewed to determine the nature of those claims. e interviews should be carried out in accordance with PAM3 guidelines on Protection Visa — 866 and the Protection Visa Procedures
Manual: Border applicants.’: at 14.11.1–2. e Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Cth), Protection Visa Procedures Manual (PAM3, 1 November 2000) states that ‘[a] person in immigration clearance may apply for a [protection visa]’, and provided further instructions for screening persons arriving with, and without, a valid visa and referring them to the
appropriate application process: at 2.5.1, 2.5.5. For an early exploration of Australia’s practice
of removing travellers who arrive at airports without authorisation, see Savitri Taylor, ‘Rethinking Australia’s Practice of “Turning Around” Unauthorised Arrivals: e Case for Good Faith
Implementation of Australia’s Protection Obligations’ (1999) 11(1) Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change 43.
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penalisation of refugees and asylum seekers on account of their illegal entry or
presence under international law. is Part seeks to initiate a deeper exploration of the international law implications of a policy that has not previously
been the subject of scholarly consideration. Part concludes that the entry
screening procedures may be inconsistent with both domestic and international law.
As vividly demonstrated in the two Saudi cases, the entry screening procedures go beyond a simple inquiry into whether an individual is seeking protection. Rather, entry screening enables discretionary decision-making as to the
strength and validity of a protection claim in a procedure lacking transparency
and largely shielded from judicial review.
I I E N T RY S C R E E N I N G P R O C E D U R E S F O R I N D I V I D UA L S S E E K I N G
T O E N G AG E A U S T R A L IA ’ S P R O T E C T I O N O B L I G AT I O N S I N
I M M I G R AT I O N C L E A R A N C E
ough individuals may seek protection in Australia aer arriving by water, or
by air, legal scholarship tends to place greater focus on those seeking to reach
Australia by boat. 20 To be sure, policies of interdiction and oﬀshore processing,
among other practices, raise important and enduring questions about Australia’s regard for human rights principles and the implementation of its international legal obligations. 21 Yet many of these policies have associated analogues in the context of air arrivals. For example, an individual who reaches any
part of Australian territory by boat, without a visa, is designated an ‘unauthorised maritime arrival’ (‘UMA’) 22 and may not make a ‘valid application’ for a
visa subject to a non-compellable ministerial power permitting them to do so. 23
However, non-citizens who arrive at an Australian airport with a valid visa and
seek protection, but who are subsequently refused immigration clearance, are

20

21

22
23

See, eg, Jane McAdam, ‘Australia and Asylum Seekers’ (2013) 25(3) International Journal of
Refugee Law 435; Michelle Foster and Jason Pobjoy, ‘A Failed Case of Legal Exceptionalism?:
Refugee Status Determination in Australia’s “Excised” Territory’ (2011) 23(4) International
Journal of Refugee Law 583; Andonea Dickson, ‘Distancing Asylum Seekers from the State:
Australia’s Evolving Political Geography of Immigration and Border Control’ (2015) 46(4) Australian Geographer 437.
For a detailed examination of these questions, see generally Ghezelbash (n 16); omas Gammelto-Hansen, Access to Asylum: International Refugee Law and the Globalisation of Migration
Control (Cambridge University Press, 2011); David Scott FitzGerald, Refuge Beyond Reach:
How Rich Democracies Repel Asylum Seekers (Oxford University Press, 2019).
Migration Act (n 15) s 5AA.
Ibid s 46A.
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considered ‘unauthorised air arrivals’ (‘UAA’) 24 and legally reconstituted as outside of the ‘migration zone’. 25 e consequence is that the individual is detained
and precluded from being able to access a permanent protection visa. 26 is
reconstitution triggers an entry screening process that can, at best, result in being granted the facilities to apply for a temporary protection visa. At worst, it
may lead to the summary removal of the individual from Australia.
is Part examines the entry screening process for non-citizens who seek
protection at Australian airports at or before immigration clearance. ough
neither the public, nor the DHA has reliable data on the number of individuals
who have raised protection claims at Australian airports, currently available
statistics shed some light on the numbers of individuals arriving by air who
have interacted with various aspects of the onshore protection or deterrence
framework. is Part then identifies and defines various legal terms used in two
newly-released DHA guidelines while providing an overview of operational
policy and procedure for protection claims at airports. 27 Part II concludes with
24

ough not defined by the Migration Act (n 15), the term ‘unauthorised air arrivals’ is used to
distinguish this class of persons: see, eg, Migration and Maritime Powers Bill Explanatory
Memorandum (n 10) 113 [754], which states that
[a]n unauthorised air arrival does not have a valid visa that is in eﬀect when they enter
Australia or has had their visa cancelled in immigration clearance. While some of these
persons may have arrived in Australia by lawful means, they may have been refused entry
at Australian airports or ports for reasons including that they are found not to intend to
abide by the visa conditions (for example, where the reason for the grant of the visa no
longer exists) or on the basis of document fraud.

25
26

27

See generally Evidence to Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Aﬀairs,
Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 21 October 2019, 103 (Michael Outram, Australian Border
Force Commissioner) (‘Commissioner Outram’s Evidence to Senate Standing Committee’).
Migration Act (n 15) s 5 (definition of ‘migration zone’).
Immigration clearance, which grants entry into the ‘migration zone’, is required under s 72(1)
of the Migration Act (n 15) before a person may apply for a bridging visa that may lead to the
later protection visa. See below nn 88–9 and accompanying text.
e first newly-released document is the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (Cth),
Entry Screening Guidelines (August 2013) (‘Entry Screening Guidelines’). e second is the Department of Home Aﬀairs (Cth), Protection Claims at the Border (Procedural Instruction, 21
November 2018) (‘Protection Claims at the Border Instruction’). e Protection Claims at the
Border Instruction (n 27) indicates that it must be read in conjunction with several other documents, including the Department of Home Aﬀairs (Cth), Events aer Refusal of Immigration
Clearance (BC-2671, 8 August 2018) (‘Events aer Refusal Instruction’) and the Department of
Home Aﬀairs (Cth), Summary Removal (BC-2460, 3 June 2018) (‘Summary Removal Instruction’). ese documents were obtained as part of a series of requests under the FOI Act (n 1):
Department of Home Aﬀairs (Cth), Freedom of Information (FOI) Request: Access Decision
(ADF2018/236776,
3
April
2019)
<https://www.righttoknow.org.au/request/policies_and_procedures_regardin#incoming14558>; Department of Home Aﬀairs (Cth), Freedom of Information (FOI) Request: Access
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an examination of Australia’s onshore protection framework for air arrivals,
which serves to frame the analysis of the various domestic legal and practical
issues surrounding the entry screening process addressed in Part III.
A Overview and Statistics
e Migration Act is the primary source of legislative authority for Australia’s
immigration system and sets forth the object of ‘regulat[ing], in the national
interest, the coming into, and presence in Australia of non-citizens.’ 28 is
framework relies upon the existence and issuance of visas as the sole means by
which a non-citizen may lawfully enter or remain in Australia. 29 e visa requirement also underpins the DHA’s strategic approach to border management,
which constructs the ‘border’ as ‘a complex continuum that encompasses the
physical border, [DHA’s] oﬀshore operations, and [DHA’s] activities in Australian maritime and air domains’. 30 is system of border controls and defences
specifically includes ‘work ahead of, at and aer the border’ and ‘collaborat[ion]
with domestic and international partners in law enforcement and policy’,
among other eﬀorts. 31
For an individual seeking to travel to Australia by air, this construction of
the border as a continuum invokes a multi-step process of entry which requires
a successful visa application, followed by subsequent phases of remote and inperson eligibility reviews. Where a person may seek protection in Australia, or
is perceived by the government as a potential asylum seeker, each review phase
creates a point of inquiry permitting enforcement actors to identify and take
action against ‘those who are non-compliant with their visa conditions’ among

28

29

30

31

Decision
(OBJ2019/30118,
11
December
2019)
<https://www.righttoknow.org.au/request/policies_and_procedural_instruct#incoming16256>.
Migration Act (n 15) s 4(1). Section 51 of the Australian Constitution sets forth the legislative
powers of the Parliament. ese include ‘naturalization and aliens’ as well as ‘immigration and
emigration’: at ss 51(xix), (xxvii).
Section 4(2) of the Migration Act (n 15) states that ‘[t]o advance its object, this Act provides
for visas permitting non-citizens to enter or remain in Australia and the Parliament intends
that this Act be the only source of the right of non-citizens to so enter or remain.’
Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Cth), Strategy 2020 (Strategy Paper, July
2015) 2 (‘Strategy 2020’). See also the Australian Border Force’s (‘ABF’) statement: ‘We consider
the border not to be a purely physical barrier separating nation states, but a complex continuum stretching oﬀshore and onshore, including [its] overseas maritime, physical border and
domestic dimensions’: Australian Government, ‘Australian Border Force’, Directory (Web Page,
18 April 2019) <https://www.directory.gov.au/portfolios/home-aﬀairs/department-homeaﬀairs/australian-border-force-0>.
Strategy 2020 (n 30) 12.
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other disqualifications. 32 ough much of this process occurs extraterritorially
and aims to prevent the arrival of persons without prior authorisation, Australia
has extended these ‘non-entrée policies’ 33 to individuals arriving with prior authorisation, by air, in its physical territory. As a result, evaluating Australia’s
compliance with its international protection obligations in the context of air
arrivals — as well as the domestic legal eﬀects of its implementation choices —
requires a holistic understanding of the border continuum and the interplay
between layers of enforcement focused screening and access to the legal
migration framework.
In the financial year of 2018–19, the ABF processed 44.7 million air travellers arriving with visas at Australian airports. 34 Yet, for an asylum seeker, the
requirement to obtain a valid visa presents the first obstacle to lawful entry. 35
As the Australian government ‘does not issue a visa for the purpose of entering
its asylum system’, 36 the individual must qualify for another type of visa. 37
Where a potential asylum seeker successfully obtains a visa, the government
32

33

34
35

36
37

Ibid 17. See also Hirsch (n 16): ‘By requiring all non-citizens to hold a valid visa, and by employing a range of extraterritorial visa checking systems, Australia is able to remotely control
who can enter and exit its ports’: at 55; Commissioner Outram’s Evidence to Senate Standing
Committee (n 24) 100–4.
James C Hathaway, e Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge University
Press, 2005) 291. Hathaway goes on to say that this term describes ‘the array of legalized policies adopted by States to stymie access by refugees to their territories’: at 291 n 70.
Department of Home Aﬀairs (Cth), Annual Report 2018–19 (Report, 2019) 22 (‘DHA 2018–19
Annual Report’).
Andrew Brouwer and Judith Kumin, ‘Interception and Asylum: When Migration Control and
Human Rights Collide’ (2003) 21(4) Refuge 6, 8: ‘In order to obtain a visa, an applicant must
present a valid passport, but a person who fears persecution at the hands of his or her government is unlikely to take the risk of approaching the authorities for a travel document …
“[o]en it is impossible, or too dangerous, for a refugee to obtain the necessary travel documents from authorities.”’
Hirsch (n 16) 57.
A student visa, for example, contains a ‘genuine temporary entrant’ requirement that an individual seeking protection would be unlikely to satisfy — ‘An applicant who is a genuine temporary entrant will have circumstances that support a genuine intention to temporarily enter
and remain in Australia’: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Cth), Direction
No 69: Assessing the Genuine Temporary Entrant Criterion for Student Visa and Student Guardian Visa Applications (2016) 3. All applicants for a visitor visa must satisfy the primary criteria
found in Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 600.211 (‘Migration Regulations’), which include that the
applicant genuinely intends to stay temporarily in Australia for the purpose for which the
visa is granted, having regard to …
(b) whether the applicant intends to comply with the conditions to which the Subclass 600
visa would be subject; and
(c) any other relevant matter.
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uses a range of additional measures such as Airline Liaison Oﬃcers (‘ALOs’),
carrier sanctions, and a variety of surveillance and control technologies to identify potential protection claimants and prevent access to Australian territory. 38
e ‘ALOs operate ahead of the border’ 39 at overseas airports, collaborating
with airlines, airport security groups and foreign governments to identify improperly documented travellers and facilitate ‘genuine’ travel. 40 During this
time, ALOs prevented 387 ‘improperly documented’ persons from entering
Australia, 41 while oﬄoading an additional 1,343 travellers with visas from
flights. 42 e DHA has not indicated how many of those 1,730 individuals were
prevented from travelling to Australia because of potential protection claims.
Once an international traveller has arrived in Australia, they are considered
to be outside the ‘migration zone’ under Australian domestic law until they are
‘immigration cleared’. 43 Immigration clearance is a legal term of art describing
the zone that every passenger must pass through before being allowed to legally
enter Australia. 44 To be ‘immigration cleared’, the traveller must provide evidence of identity, a valid visa, 45 and leave the airport entirely — not only the
immigration and customs zone — with the permission of a ‘clearance authority’
and not subject to immigration detention. 46 Whether a traveller has been immigration cleared has a significant impact on their eligibility to apply for certain
visas, especially a permanent protection visa, though international law makes
clear that states may not use these types of international zones to prevent individuals ‘from seeking and enjoying asylum from persecution’. 47 In 2018–19, the
38
39
40
41
42

43
44
45
46
47

Hirsch (n 16) 59–60.
Department of Home Aﬀairs (Cth), Annual Report 2017–18 (Report, 2018) 42 (‘DHA 2017–18
Annual Report’).
Ibid. See also DHA 2018–19 Annual Report (n 34) 22; Commissioner Outram’s Evidence to
Senate Standing Committee (n 24) 100–4.
DHA 2018–19 Annual Report (n 34) 22.
Ibid. is number represents an increase of more than 142% from 2017–18. e 2017–18 number of 555 oﬄoaded travellers represented an increase from 2016–17 of 300%, partly as a result
of ‘engagement with airlines [which] led to an increase in traveller referrals to ALOs by airline
staﬀ ’: DHA 2017–18 Annual Report (n 39) 45.
Migration Act (n 15) ss 5 (definition of ‘immigration cleared’), 166, 172.
Ibid ss 166, 172.
In the case of an Australian citizen, the requirement is to provide evidence of identity and
Australian citizenship: ibid s 166(1)(a)(i).
Ibid s 172(1). See also Cujba v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Aﬀairs (2001) 109
FCR 11, 15–16 [16]–[18] (Branson J).
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Legal Considerations on State Responsibilities for Persons Seeking International Protection in Transit Areas or “International” Zones at Airports
(Discussion
Paper,
17
January
2019)
1
[3]
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DHA refused immigration clearance to 4,191 individuals who had arrived in
Australia by plane, with a visa. 48
Also in 2018–19, the DHA reported that only 60 travellers requested protection upon arrival at an international airport in Australia, a decrease from 62
claimants in the prior year. 49 However, this number is likely to be inaccurate
because the DHA has expressly conceded it does not track the total number of
protection claims raised at airports. In response to requests from the authors
under the FOI Act, the DHA stated that ‘as there is no distinct way of determining which of the Manual referrals may have related to protection Claims, the
total number of persons raising protection claims at Australia’s borders
remains undetermined’. 50
e DHA also did not disclose how many of the 60 protection claimants
were removed from Australia, or how many were granted some form of protection. 51 is small number of asylum applicants at airports stands in stark contrast to the 24,566 applicants for protection visas in 2018–19 who arrived in
Australia with a visa, by air, and applied aer being immigration cleared. 52 e
number of individuals who apply for protection visas aer immigration clearance raise distinct policy and legal questions, which are not the focus of this
article. Reference to this statistic simply highlights the apparent disparity in
protection claims recorded to occur before or during immigration clearance, as
opposed to claims made aer immigration clearance. In short, the DHA’s acknowledgment that the agency does not keep accurate, disaggregated data hinders eﬀective evaluation of the entry screening process.

48
49

50
51

52

<https://www.refworld.org/docid/5c4730a44.html> (‘Legal Considerations regarding Air Arrivals’); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155
UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980) art 27 (‘VCLT’).
DHA 2018–19 Annual Report (n 34) 39.
Commissioner Outram’s Evidence to Senate Standing Committee (n 24) 103. For prior year
information, see Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Cth), Response to Question on Notice No 231 to Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Aﬀairs,
Parliament of Australia, Canberra, Asylum Claims at Australian Airports, 23 October 2017
(‘DIBP Response to Question on Notice’).
FOI Decision on Internal Review (n 9) 3.
DIBP Response to Question on Notice (n 49): ‘e detailed breakdown of this information
requested is not available in the Department’s reporting suite and is not disaggregated from
other Protection visa assessment outcomes.’
It is important to note that the 24,566 total provided by the DHA does not indicate the year in
which the applicant first-entered Australia. e number only reflects the number of individuals
applying for protection in the 2018–19 reporting year, which does not mean that the applicant
entered Australia in the 2018–19 reporting year: Department of Home Aﬀairs (Cth), Onshore
Humanitarian Program 2018–19: Delivery and Outcomes for Non-Illegal Maritime Arrival
(Non-IMA) as at 30 June 2019 (Factsheet, 2019).
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B Entry Screening Guidelines and the Procedural Instructions
DHA staﬀ who make decisions, or exercise powers or functions under the Migration Act, have a duty to make decisions and exercise their powers or functions in accordance with legislation and legal principle. 53 While agencies may
develop policies to facilitate decision-making, policy documents do not have
the force of law. 54 e DHA has issued several policy documents intended to
govern the actions of staﬀ in the ‘aviation and maritime environments providing immigration clearance’ for those ‘[t]ravellers who seek to engage Australia’s
protection obligations whilst in immigration clearance.’ 55 e two key documents focused on here are the Entry Screening Guidelines and the Protection
Claims at the Border Instruction, which together provide an overview of operational policy and procedure. 56
‘Entry screening’ is the process to which all ‘non-citizens who are refused
immigration clearance at an airport and claim that they cannot return to their
home country’ 57 are subjected. e Entry Screening Guidelines set forth the general policy guidance and procedures for entry screening, while the Protection
Claims at the Border Instruction provides detailed, step-by-step guidance for
processing protection claims at the border. According to the Entry Screening
Guidelines, entry screening is conducted to ascertain a non-citizen’s reasons for
travel to Australia and any reason why they cannot return to their home country as part of the ‘department’s consideration of whether a non-citizen should
be removed from Australia, or whether they should remain in Australia

53

54

55
56
57

Protection Claims at the Border Instruction (n 27) 18, citing the Australian Public Service
(‘APS’) Code of Conduct, which provides that ‘[a]n APS employee must comply with any lawful and reasonable direction given by someone in the employee’s Agency who has authority to
give the direction’: Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) s 13(5). See also Australian Border Force Act
2015 (Cth) ss 55(1), 57.
See, eg, Sariman and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] AATA 387: ‘[P]olicy documents are merely a statement of usual administrative practice and do not have the force of
law’: at [11] (Dr McDermott), citing Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
Aﬀairs v Walsh (2002) 125 FCR 31, 37 [24] (Heerey, Mansfield and Hely JJ). See also
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Aﬀairs (1979) 24 ALR 577; Drake v Minister for
Immigration and Ethnic Aﬀairs [No 2] (1979) 2 ALD 634 (‘Drake [No 2]’). While lacking the
force of law, see below Part III(C) discussing the circumstances in which policy may still be
legally relevant for the purposes of judicial review.
Protection Claims at the Border Instruction (n 27) 4. Protection claims made aer immigration
clearance are outside the scope of the procedural instruction.
Entry Screening Guidelines (n 27); Protection Claims at the Border Instruction (n 27).
Entry Screening Guidelines (n 27) 3. All UMAs are also subject to entry screening. However,
screening will not be conducted where a non-citizen requests removal from Australia prior to
being screened: at 4.
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pending further departmental consideration.’ 58 us, entry screening will either result in a non-citizen being ‘screened-in’ if their reasons for why they cannot return to their home country relate to Australia’s protection obligations, or
‘screened-out’ if their reasons do not relate to Australia’s protection obligations. 59 A ‘screened-in’ non-citizen will be allowed to remain in Australia pending further consideration of their case, while a ‘screened-out’ non-citizen ‘is
[placed] on a removal pathway’. 60
Figure 1: Entry Screening Process for a Traveller Refused Immigration Clearance and
‘Screened In’

Border Clearance Officer
(BDO)

1st Interview — Visa
Determination Officer
(VDO)

Immigration Clearance
Refused / Traveller
Detained

2nd Interview — Visa
Determination Officer
(VDO)

2nd Interview Results
E-mailed to Duty
Delegate, Humanitarian
Program Operations
Branch

Duty Delegate Issues
Screening Decision

‘Screened In’

Traveller May Lodge
Protection Visa
Application
(TPV or SHEV only)

58
59
60

Ibid 3.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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Figure 2: Entry Screening Process for Traveller Refused Immigration Clearance and
‘Screened Out’

Border Clearance Officer
(BDO)

1st Interview — Visa
Determination Officer
(VDO)

Immigration Clearance
Refused / Traveller
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Determination Officer
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Delegate, Humanitarian
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Duty Delegate Issues
Screening Decision

‘Screened out’

Begin Removal Process

According to the Protection Claims at the Border Instruction, a non-citizen such
as Amal, who arrives at an Australian airport may ‘claim protection at any time
while in immigration clearance’. 61 Where a traveller indicates a ‘wish to seek
protection’ 62 to a Border Clearance Oﬃcer (‘BCO’) at the primary line, 63 that
oﬃcer must refer the traveller to a Visa Determination Oﬃcer (‘VDO’) 64 in the
secondary immigration area. 65 ough the non-citizen is referred to the secondary immigration area aer raising a protection claim, the first interview
with the VDO only determines whether the non-citizen can be immigration
cleared and does not explore the protection claim. 66 To that end, the VDO examines whether the non-citizen has complied with s 166 of the Migration Act
and, if the non-citizen has presented with a visa, whether ‘the purpose for the
visa grant aligns with the traveller’s intention for entry to Australia.’ 67 In other
61

62
63
64
65
66
67

Protection Claims at the Border Instruction (n 27) 4. See also Summary Removal Instruction (n
27) which directs ABF oﬃcials to ‘immediately refer the traveller to their supervisor for advice
on how to proceed’ if at any time the individual makes a request for protection ‘or states that
they are fearful of returning to their country of citizenship or usual residence’: at 11.
Protection Claims at the Border Instruction (n 27) 4.
A Border Clearance Oﬃcer is defined as an ‘ABF oﬃcer who has delegated authority to undertake primary Customs, Immigration and Biosecurity clearance’: ibid 5 (emphasis added).
A Visa Determination Oﬃcer (‘VDO’) is defined as an ‘ABF oﬃcer who has a delegated authority to undertake secondary Customs, Immigration and clearance’: ibid 9 (emphasis added).
Ibid 4.
Ibid 12.
Ibid.

2020]

Assessing Refugee Protection Claims at Australian Airports

177

words, if the person intends to enter Australia to seek asylum, they may be
found not to be entering Australia for the intended purposes of their visa, such
as tourism, work or study. e DHA interprets this as allowing them to cancel
the traveller’s visa as they may have misrepresented their reason for
entering Australia. 68
Aer the first interview, the Protection Claims at the Border Instruction requires the VDO to discuss the case with the Senior Border Force Oﬃcer or
Border Force Supervisor and decide whether to:
1 refuse immigration clearance on the basis of non-compliance with s 166 of
the Migration Act, where the traveller presents without a travel document
and/or visa;
2 issue a Notice of intention to consider cancellation … where the traveller
holds a visa and … there are grounds to consider visa cancellation;
3 continue with immigration clearance, where the traveller meets s 166 of the
Migration Act and there is insuﬃcient or no evidence to support consideration of visa cancellation. 69
If the non-citizen is refused immigration clearance for either having presented without a visa and/or travel document, or having their visa cancelled at
the border, the VDO must detain the non-citizen and provide them with a
break before commencing the second interview, also called the ‘prescreening interview’. 70
A pre-screening interview must be conducted where a non-citizen makes a
claim for protection in immigration clearance in order to establish the noncitizen’s reason for travel to Australia and record any claims that ‘prima facie
may assist the delegate to decide whether the traveller may engage Australia’s
protection obligations.’ 71 e VDO must follow a prescribed template to record
‘the traveller’s claims that may relate to Australia’s non-refoulement

68

69
70
71

For an in-depth examination of issues surrounding visa cancellations in immigration clearance
see, eg, Mary Crock and Laurie Berg, Immigration, Refugees and Forced Migration: Law, Policy
and Practice in Australia (Federation Press, 2011) 148–55.
Protection Claims at the Border Instruction (n 27) 13.
Ibid.
Ibid 14. e DHA has specific procedures for unaccompanied minors who are refused immigration clearance at an airport, which include that an independent observer must be available
for the interview: Entry Screening Guidelines (n 27) 10.
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obligations’ 72 arising under the Migration Act. 73 During the pre-screening interview, the VDO must also facilitate access to a consular oﬃcial or the Oﬃce
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’) upon the
non-citizen’s request. 74
Aer concluding the pre-screening interview, the VDO must ‘email the traveller’s details and a copy of the completed pre-screening interview to the Duty
Delegate, Humanitarian Program Operations Branch’ who will make ‘a screen
in or screen out decision.’ 75 e Duty Delegate, in turn considers the potential
refugee and complementary protection claims and decides — based upon the
information elicited by the VDO at the pre-screening interview 76 — whether
the claims meet the entry screening ‘threshold’. 77 e screening ‘threshold’ considers only whether a non-citizen’s reasons for claiming they cannot return to
their home country warrant an assessment of Australia’s protection obligations
through a departmental process. 78 e Entry Screening Guidelines make clear
72

Protection Claims at the Border Instruction (n 27) 14.

73

e Migration Act (n 15) codifies Australia’s interpretation of its international obligations. e
VDO first assess whether the person meets the statutory definition of a ‘refugee’ as defined by
s 5H, which is similar to art 1(a) of the 1951 Convention (n 11). Where a person does not meet
this definition, the VDO will then assess whether the person may receive complementary protection provided by s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act (n 15). Complementary protection arises
from Australia’s obligations under ICCPR (n 11); Second Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, GA Res
44/128, A/RES/44/128 (15 December 1989); CAT (n 11).

74

Protection Claims at the Border Instruction (n 27) 14. It is unclear whether this obligation includes informing the passenger of their right to access a consular oﬃcial or the UNHCR.

75

76

77
78

See also Protection Claims at the Border Instruction (n 27) 23.

Ibid 15. e Duty Delegate, also called the ‘screening oﬃcer’, is ‘generally an executive-level
oﬃcer reporting to the Global Manager, Refugee and Humanitarian Visas’: Entry Screening
Guidelines (n 27) 4.
Dual enforcement and humanitarian protection frameworks compete throughout the entry
screening process, creating legal and operational opacity. For example, the Entry Screening
Guidelines (n 27) direct screening oﬃcers to assess a non-citizen’s claims having regard to Australia’s protection obligations under various international instruments: at 5–6. However, VDOs
must gather evidence of those claims, which forms the basis of the Duty Delegate’s decision:
see above n 73 and accompanying text. e instructions may be problematic where they could
lead to VDO assessments of a non-citizen’s protection claim either not having regard, or having
regard to the agent’s own understanding of the relevant legal instruments, resulting in a decision not to action a Duty Delegate referral or pursue a particular line of inquiry in a prescreening interview.
Entry Screening Guidelines (n 27) 6.
Ibid. But see the reaﬃrmation of ‘the fundamental importance … of the principle of non-refoulement … of persons who may be subjected to persecution if returned to their country of
origin irrespective of whether or not they have been formally recognized as refugees’: Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Addendum to the Report of the United
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that ‘the screening oﬃcer does not need to make a case for the non-citizen’ and
‘if the non-citizen does not present a fear of any serious or significant harm’
they should be ‘screened-out’. 79 However, ‘Australia may be at risk of breaching
its non-refoulement obligations’ where ‘information is available indicating’ that
the non-citizen may be subject to ‘a serious or significant harm’ in their country
of origin, ‘even if this is not explicitly articulated by the non-citizen’. 80
ere is no designated timeframe for the Duty Delegate to issue a screening
decision, but the Protection Claims at the Border Instruction anticipates situations in which a decision is either not received in a reasonable period of time
or it is unlikely that a decision will be made within a reasonable period of
time. 81 However, the range of options available to the VDO in these circumstances include only discussing the case with a supervisor and duty manager,
telephoning the Duty Delegate, or transferring the non-citizen to an Immigration Detention Facility (‘IDF’) pending the decision. 82 It is unclear where the
non-citizen might be held in the event that the Duty Delegate’s decision is not
issued in a reasonable period of time and the non-citizen is not transferred to
an IDF.
Where the Duty Delegate issues a ‘screened in’ decision and the non-citizen
is still in immigration clearance, 83 the VDO must communicate the decision to
the non-citizen and explain that they will be transferred to an IDF where they
may lodge a protection visa application. 84 If the non-citizen is located in an IDF
at the time of the ‘screened in’ decision, the VDO must advise the Status Resolution Oﬃcer of the decision and transfer the case to the Compliance Status
Resolution service aer creating a referral to case management. 85 In this scenario, the VDO is not required to advise the non-citizen of the screening decision, nor is the VDO required to advise the non-citizen that they may lodge a
protection visa application. 86 If ‘screened in’, only two classes of protection visas

79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Conclusions of the Committee — Non-Refoulement,
UN DOC A/32/12 (31 October 1977) 14 [4(c)] (‘Conclusions of the Committee: Non-Refoulement’).
Entry Screening Guidelines (n 27) 8.
Ibid.
Protection Claims at the Border Instruction (n 27) 15–16.
Ibid.
Ibid 16. e language appears to refer to immigration clearance as a place, rather than as the
process of being immigration cleared.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

180

Melbourne University Law Review

[Vol 44(1):162

are available. 87 e Class XD temporary protection (‘TPV’) 88 or the Class XE
safe haven enterprise visas (‘SHEV’). 89 Applicants generally have access to the
standard protection visa application process, rather than the fast-track procedures that apply to UMAs. 90 However, the Minister retains the power to designate additional classes of arrivals as being subject to the fast-track procedures
by means of issuing a legislative instrument, 91 and has used this power in the
past to expand the fast-track procedures to apply to certain asylum seekers who
arrived by plane. 92
Where the Duty Delegate issues a ‘screened out’ decision while the non-citizen is still in immigration clearance, the VDO must advise the non-citizen of
the decision and begin the removal process. 93 e Protection Claims at the Border Instruction notes that a non-citizen may still insist on lodging a protection
visa application following a ‘screened out’ decision. 94 However, where a noncitizen is legally barred from lodging a visa application, the VDO ‘is to advise
the traveller they may attempt to do this but the application would be considered invalid’ and that attempted lodgment will not delay arrangements for their
87

88
89

90

91
92

93
94

Migration Regulations (n 37) sch 1 pt 4 reg 1401(3)(d)(vi) explicitly requires a person to be
‘immigration cleared’ before a valid application for a Class XA protection visa is received. A
person must also not hold or have previously held either a temporary protection visa (‘TPV’)
or safe haven enterprise visa (‘SHEV’): at reg 1401(3)(d)(i)–(ia).
A TPV is a three year visa that requires the person ‘was not immigration cleared’: ibid sch 1
pt 4 reg 1403(3)(d)(vi).
A SHEV is a five year visa that similarly to a TPV requires the person ‘was not immigration
cleared’: ibid sch 1 pt 4 reg 1404(3)(d)(vii). Although a UAA TPV holder is only permitted to
apply for another TPV or SHEV, it may be possible for a UAA SHEV holder to apply for certain
other visas: ibid pt 2 div 2.1 reg 2.06AAB. However, it appears that the Migration Act (n 15)
s 46A(1) bar which prevents UMAs from applying for other visas does not apply to UAAs,
thereby allowing a UAA SHEV holder to apply for other subsequent visas without needing to
meet the regional work or study requirement.
For an overview of the fast-track procedures: see generally Emily McDonald and Maria O’Sullivan, ‘Protecting Vulnerable Refugees: Procedural Fairness in the Australian Fast Track Regime’ (2018) 41(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 1003.
Migration Act (n 15) s 5(1AA)(b).
See, eg, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Cth), Migration (IMMI 17/015: Person Who Is a Fast Track Applicant) Instrument 2017 (IMMI 17/015, 26 July 2017), designating
plane arrivals who had previously been refused a protection visa but had raised new claims in
relation to the data breach on the departmental website in February 2014. e validity of this
instrument and its application to plane arrivals was upheld in SZTVU v Minister for Home
Aﬀairs (2019) 268 FCR 497. See also Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural
Aﬀairs (Cth), Migration (Fast Track Applicant Class: Temporary Protection and Safe Haven Enterprise Visa Holders) Instrument 2019 (LIN 19/007, 26 March 2019). is expanded the fast
track procedures to apply to all applicants re-applying for a TPV or SHEV.
Protection Claims at the Border Instruction (n 27) 16.
Ibid.
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removal. 95 Where the non-citizen is located in an IDF at the time of the
‘screened out’ decision, the Border Force Oﬃcer must ensure the non-citizen is
advised of the decision and begin the removal process. 96
e Entry Screening Guidelines and Protection Claims at the Border Instruction do not provide any avenues to seek review of either the decision to cancel
a visa during the entry screening process because a non-citizen has raised a
protection claim, nor the screening decision of the Duty Delegate. 97 Similarly,
the decision of either a BCO or VDO to refer a traveller who has raised a potential protection claim for exploration of that claim appears not to engage any
internal review or oversight mechanism. It is not known whether the two Saudi
women who arrived at Sydney Airport in November 2017 were referred to the
Duty Delegate of the Humanitarian Program Operations Branch for consideration of a screening decision. However, by having their claims refused in immigration clearance, the women were able to be removed without any access to
lawyers or avenue for appeal. e legal and practical problems raised by the
entry screening procedures are explored in Part III, following a review of the
statutory framework relevant to protection claims raised by non-citizens travelling to Australian airports from abroad.
C Purported Statutory Basis for Entry Screening Procedures
is Part examines the statutory framework within which entry screening procedures are carried out. We begin with an examination of the government’s purported justification, which frames the procedures as informing the duty to detain and remove certain non-citizens. We explore the tension and potential disconnect between this justification and the related legislative and regulatory
rules regarding protection visas, and statutory safeguards for persons in immigration detention. e Entry Screening Guidelines construct ‘entry screening’ as
a process that applies to any non-citizen refused immigration clearance at an
airport who claims that they cannot return to their home country. 98
95

96
97

98

Ibid. It should be noted that a legal bar to lodging a visa at this stage refers to Australian domestic law, which — in the context of seeking protection — conflicts with international law
and will be discussed below in Part IV. See also VCLT (n 47) art 27.
Protection Claims at the Border Instruction (n 27) 17.
e Events aer Refusal Instruction (n 27) directs ABF oﬃcers to ensure that travellers understand ‘visa cancellation decisions made in immigration clearance are not subject to merits review’: at 6. Note, however, that it may be possible to seek judicial review of a visa cancellation
in immigration clearance: see, eg, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Srouji
(2014) 139 ALD 267 (‘Srouji’). e practical impediments to accessing judicial review in immigration clearance are discussed below in Part III(A).
e process also applies to all non-citizens who arrive in Australia as UMAs: see above n 57.
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While the Entry Screening Guidelines stipulate that there is ‘no separate or
specific statutory basis for entry screening’, the document explains that ‘entry
screening is undertaken to inform (among other considerations) a decision
about whether to remove an unlawful non‐citizen under s 198(2) of the Migration Act.’ 99 e section provides that
[a]n oﬃcer must remove as soon as reasonably practicable an unlawful non-citizen:
(a) who is covered by subparagraph 193(1)(a)(i), (ii) or (iii) or
paragraph 193(1)(b), (c) or (d); and
(b) who has not subsequently been immigration cleared; and
(c) who either:
(i) has not made a valid application for a substantive visa that can be
granted when the applicant is in the migration zone; or
(ii) has made a valid application for a substantive visa, that can be
granted when the applicant is in the migration zone, that has been
finally determined. 100

Presumably, the government’s position is that the entry screening procedures
inform the considerations under ss 198(2)(c)(i)–(ii) as to the existence of a
valid pending or determined visa application. We will further interrogate the
validity of this claim in Part III(B). What is important to note for current purposes is that there is a link between the removal powers under s 198(2), which
the government cites as the authority for pre-screening, and the provisions of
the Migration Act relevant to making and determining visa applications.
Under the current legislative and regulatory framework, a non-citizen who
is refused immigration clearance at an Australian airport and raises a protection claim triggers a complex interaction between numerous substantive provisions of the Migration Act and the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (‘Migration
Regulations’), the eﬀects of which are not fully captured in either the Entry
Screening Guidelines or the Protection Claims at the Border Instruction. As a result, non-citizens refused immigration clearance cannot make a valid application for a permanent protection visa. Nonetheless, the Migration Act and regulations define a clear path for a non-citizen to seek a temporary protection visa.
Yet, the entry screening policy operates in a manner that prioritises detention
99
100

Entry Screening Guidelines (n 27) 3.
Migration Act (n 15) s 198(2). Relevantly, s 193(1)(a)(i) refers to persons detained under
s 189(1) on being refused immigration clearance.
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and removal considerations and hinders the eﬀective operation of the legislative and regulatory protection visa framework.
I II C HA L L E N G I N G

AN

E N T RY S C R E E N I N G D E C I S I O N

e entry screening procedures appear to have been designed in a way to limit
avenues available for reviewing adverse determinations by the Duty Delegate.
Once a traveller is screened-out, there are no options available to seek a review
of the merits of the decision and the VDO must immediately begin the removal
process. 101 e Entry Screening Guidelines and the Protection Claims at the Border Instruction do not provide any avenues of internal review, nor any access to
merits review at the Refugee and Migration Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘AAT’). Decisions made when a non-citizen is in immigration
clearance or where they have been refused immigration clearance and not subsequently been immigration cleared are expressly excluded from the jurisdiction of the AAT. 102 While merits review is unavailable, there may be scope to
seek judicial review of adverse decisions in certain circumstances. is Part explores four grounds for such review, including a non-citizen’s right to access
legal advice and visa application forms, the validity of these policy documents,
instances of disregard or misapplication of the entry screening procedures, and
considerations of procedural fairness, along with the practical impediments to
accessing judicial review.
To date, there have not been any cases which directly challenge a decision
made under the current entry screening procedures. is is likely due to the
practical impediments to seeking judicial review which we discuss further below. It may also be a result of the fact that where an individual does manage to
overcome these obstacles, they are permitted to obtain legal assistance and assert their right to apply for a protection visa, regardless of the outcome of the
screening process, negating the need to pursue the matter in the courts. 103
ere are however, a long line of cases which deal with the cancellation of visas
in immigration clearance. ese cases generally turn on questions of procedural fairness and the adequacy of the timeframe which applicants are provided
101
102
103

Events aer Refusal Instruction (n 27) 6; Protection Claims at the Border Instruction (n 27) 16.
Migration Act (n 15) ss 338(2)(c)(i)–(ii).
Additional empirical research may be needed to determine why no cases directly challenging
a decision made under the entry screening procedures have been the subject of judicial review.
Assessing the legal and policy consequences of the practical application of the entry screening
procedures presents a potentially promising avenue of future inquiry, though obtaining access
to conduct such research may prove diﬃcult: see generally Regina Jeﬀeries, ‘Research Access
and Adaptation in the Securitised Field of Australian Refugee and Asylum Law’ [2019] (1)
Journal of the Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies 49.
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to respond to adverse information relied upon to cancel the visa. While there
are examples of earlier cases where the courts have intervened on behalf of entrants and overturned visa cancellations, 104 the more recent cases have taken a
broad view as to the discretion that should be aﬀorded to immigration oﬃcers
in this context. 105 Given that these deal with decisions to cancel a visa under s
116 of the Migration Act, rather than entry screening for protection claims, they
are of limited relevance for our current analysis. However, they demonstrate
that, despite the practical impediments, it is possible to seek judicial review of
decisions made in immigration clearance if a person can access legal advice.
One of the few examples of a reported case which directly addresses the screening process for asylum claims at the airport is Azmoudeh v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Aﬀairs. 106 In that case, Wilcox J took the extraordinary step
of ordering the return of an Iranian man from Hong Kong who was removed
without being aﬀorded an opportunity to make an application for asylum. e
man’s lawyer was waiting at the airport to lodge the application but was not
granted access to his client. Justice Wilcox was willing to intervene and provide
interlocutory relief on the grounds that it was likely that the failure to consider
the man’s claim for asylum rendered the removal unlawful. It is important to
note that the case predated the current statutory and policy framework for assessing asylum claims at airports.
Moreover, in the intervening years, the Australian government has introduced a series of reforms aimed at limiting the jurisdiction and the grounds for
judicial review of decisions made under the Migration Act. ese eﬀorts culminated in the introduction of the privative clause in s 474 of the Migration Act in
2001, which attempted to prohibit the judiciary from reviewing any decisions
made under the Act and from issuing specified remedies. 107 e 2003 High
Court decision of Plaintiﬀ S157/2002 v Commonwealth (‘Plaintiﬀ S157’) rendered the privative clause largely ineﬀective, finding that the clause only covered non-jurisdictional errors. 108 Parliament could not oust the High Court’s
original jurisdiction to review jurisdictional errors under s 75(v) of the Australian Constitution to decide matters in which one of the constitutional writs of
104
105

106
107
108

See, eg, Chiorny v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Aﬀairs (1997) 44 ALD 605.
See, eg, Zhaou v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Aﬀairs [2002] FCA
748; Srouji (n 97); Chiu v Minister for Immigration [2014] FCCA 2596; Russo v Minister for
Immigration [2015] FCCA 2526; Kaur v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCCA 3289;
Dhaliwal v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCCA 1669; DOZ16 v Minister for Immigration
[2017] FCCA 1157.
(1985) 8 ALD 281.
Migration Act (n 15) s 474.
(2003) 211 CLR 476 (‘Plaintiﬀ S157’).
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mandamus, prohibition, and injunction were sought against an ‘oﬃcer of the
Commonwealth’. Jurisdictional error occurs where the error is such that the decision made falls outside the powers conferred on the decision-maker. 109 While
courts have been reluctant to definitively define the circumstances where this
occurs, 110 they have found a wide range of errors fall under the concept. 111 e
following Parts address four potential instances of jurisdictional error, which
might be brought before the Federal Circuit Court, which has been conferred
with the same original jurisdiction as the High Court under s 75(v) of the
Australian Constitution. 112
A Right to Access Legal Advice and Visa Application Forms
Before exploring possible avenues for review in relation to the right to access
legal advice and visa application forms, it is necessary to return to the exact
nature of the power being exercised in the entry screening procedures. e government frames entry screening as a process ‘undertaken to inform (among
other considerations) a decision about whether to remove an unlawful non‐
citizen under s 198(2) of the Migration Act’. 113 Since travellers refused immigration clearance are subject to immediate, mandatory detention, 114 the Entry
Screening Guidelines and the Protection Claims at the Border Instruction must
be read in conjunction with the duty placed on immigration oﬃcials in s 256 of
the Migration Act. Section 256 applies to persons in immigration detention and
requires that
the person responsible for [their] immigration detention shall, at the request of
the person in immigration detention, give to [them] application forms for a visa
or aﬀord to [them] all reasonable facilities for making a statutory declaration for
the purposes of this Act or for obtaining legal advice or taking legal proceedings
in relation to [their] immigration detention. 115
109
110

111

112
113
114
115

Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82, 141 [163] (Hayne J) (‘Aala’).
See, eg, Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531 (‘Kirk’), where the High Court
observed that ‘[i]t is neither necessary, nor possible to attempt to mark the metes and bounds
of jurisdictional error’: at 573 [71] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
See generally Mark Aronson, ‘Jurisdictional Error and Beyond’ in Matthew Groves (ed), Modern Administrative Law in Australia: Concepts and Context (Cambridge University Press, 2014)
248, 256. See Aala (n 109).
Migration Act (n 15) s 476. e bulk of migration cases begin at the Federal Circuit Court.
Entry Screening Guidelines (n 27) 3.
See above Part II(B); Protection Claims at the Border Instruction (n 27) 13; Migration Act (n 15)
s 189.
Migration Act (n 15) s 256.
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e Protection Claims at the Border Instruction recognises this requirement,
noting that ‘[f]ollowing a screened out decision, and without any legal bar to
prevent them from doing so, a traveller may still insist on lodging a Protection
visa (‘PV’) application’. 116 erefore, where an express request for a visa application or access to legal advice is denied at any point during a traveller’s detention, the individual could seek a writ of mandamus in the Federal Circuit Court
compelling the person responsible for their detention to fulfil this request. 117
e practical diﬃculties in seeking such a remedy are immediately obvious.
Judicial review proceedings would be close to impossible to initiate without the
assistance of a lawyer, but a failure to access such assistance is exactly what is
being challenged. e importance of this practical impediment cannot be overstated, and it is equally relevant to the other grounds of review discussed below.
Individuals subject to entry screening are generally held in immigration detention at the airport and may be unable to use their mobile phones which places
their contact with the outside world in the hands of the oﬃcers responsible for
their detention. 118 Where the individual is ‘screened out’, ABF oﬃcials undertake to remove the non-citizen from the country as soon as possible pursuant
to s 198(2). 119 Removal can happen as quickly as within a few hours. e communication, movement, and time restrictions placed upon individuals in the
entry screening process may thus render attempts to challenge some aspect of
their treatment during or aer the process very diﬃcult.
ere may be further practical impediments to an individual exercising
their rights under s 256. Where a traveller explicitly requests to apply for a protection visa (or requests forms to facilitate such an application) aer being refused immigration clearance, but before the pre-screening interview has commenced, the Entry Screening Guidelines and Protection Claims at the Border Instruction appear to require the individual to wait for the Duty Delegate’s screening decision before being allowed to lodge an application. Moreover, an individual ‘screened out’ would be required to renew the request aer screening is
completed in order for it to be considered. ose individuals ‘screened out’
would have just experienced a process which they had been told was to determine whether Australia owed them protection obligations. It would be reasonable for those individuals to assume that the negative screening decision related
116

117
118
119

Protection Claims at the Border Instruction (n 27) 16. e Events aer Refusal Instruction (n 27)
states that ‘[d]etainees should only be advised that it is not possible to facilitate access to immigration assistance or legal advice if to do so would unreasonably impede the detainees removal from Australia’: at 7.
Migration Act (n 15) s 476(1).
Protection Claims at the Border Instruction (n 27) 13.
See also ibid 16–17.
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to their request to apply for a protection visa, and that the adverse determination would prohibit them from pursuing this further. Without legal advice, a
‘screened out’ individual might not be aware of their right to apply for a
protection visa.
Finally, it is unclear whether ABF oﬃcials would be required to provide an
individual internet access in order to lodge a protection visa application online.
An applicant for a TPV or SHEV may only lodge an application via the internet,
or by posting the correct paper form to the DHA Onshore Protection Oﬃce in
Sydney. 120 Given the limited time frame between the screened out decision and
the initiation of the removal process, it is highly unlikely that the applicant
would have time to lodge a valid application by post. erefore, the only realistic method by which an applicant in immigration detention at an airport might
have time to lodge a valid application is online. Yet, detention oﬃcials would
have to facilitate access to the internet — something not explicitly specified in
the Entry Screening Guidelines or the Protection Claims at the Border Instruction.
B Validity of the Entry Screening Guidelines and Procedural Instructions
Policy guidelines are only valid if they are authorised by and compatible with
the legislative powers on which they are based. 121 Chief Justice Gleeson noted
that policy will be valid only to the extent that it is
consistent with the statute under which the relevant power is conferred, and provided also that the policy is not, either in its nature or in its application, such as
to preclude the decision-maker from taking into account relevant considerations, or such as to involve the decision-maker in taking into account irrelevant
considerations. 122

If the content or application of the Entry Screening Guidelines or Protection
Claims at the Border Instruction do not meet this requirement, then they are
invalid. erefore, a person subject to a decision made under them would be
able to seek a remedy of certiorari, quashing the decision made in excess of
power, as well as mandamus, commanding the decision to be remade in accordance with what is required under the legislation.
Construing or applying the entry screening procedures in a manner that
frustrates the rights of a detainee under s 256 to access facilities to make a visa
application upon request would be unlawful. However, in circumstances where
120
121
122

Department of Home Aﬀairs (Cth), Migration (LIN 18/029: Arrangements for Protection, Refugee and Humanitarian Visas) Instrument 2018 (LIN 18/029, 13 February 2019) schs 3–4.
See, eg, Green v Daniels (1977) 13 ALR 1.
NEAT Domestic Trading Pty Ltd v AWB Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 277, 289 [24].

188

Melbourne University Law Review

[Vol 44(1):162

an individual refused immigration clearance does not make an express request,
there is no onus on the oﬃcial carrying out the screening interview to inform
the person of their rights under s 256. In fact, s 193 of the Migration Act specifically states that the government has no obligation to provide any advice or legal
guidance to persons who have been refused immigration clearance (beyond express requests under s 256). As a result, an asylum seeker ‘screened out’ in the
entry screening process, yet otherwise entitled to lodge a protection claim, may
be prevented from making an application because they did not know to request
a form or legal advice.
Even in these very narrow circumstances, it is unclear whether the procedures are valid. Despite the government’s claims to the contrary, there are no
provisions in the Migration Act that can be construed to explicitly authorise the
entry screening procedures. e Entry Screening Guidelines state that the procedures inform the decision of whether to remove an unlawful non-citizen under s 198(2) of the Migration Act. 123 Presumably, this relates to the considerations under ss 198(2)(c)(i)–(ii), which deal with a simple question of fact:
whether the person has made a valid application for a substantive visa that has
not been finally determined. However, the entry screening procedures relate to
another matter entirely. Entry screening informs a decision as to whether to
provide an individual with the facilities to lodge a protection visa application.
ey do this with reference to a preliminary assessment as to the strength of a
person’s protection claim, which serves as a procedural and functional barrier
to accessing a visa process prescribed by legislation.
Whether or not to provide an individual with the facilities to lodge a protection visa application is qualitatively diﬀerent from the question of whether a
valid application has already been made. In fact, s 197C of the Migration Act
makes it clear that, under domestic law, Australia’s non-refoulement obligations
are irrelevant to the exercise of the removal powers under s 198. It is thus implausible that entry screening, designed to identify protection claims, could be
authorised by a power that specifically excludes such claims as being a relevant
consideration. ere are no provisions elsewhere in the Migration Act that
would authorise such a line of inquiry undertaken during the entry screening
procedures. e Migration Act and the Migration Regulations include detailed
instructions regarding the requirements to make a valid TPV or SHEV

123

Entry Screening Guidelines (n 27) 3.
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application. 124 None of these provisions authorises the consideration of the
merits of the asylum claim in relation to the validity of the visa application. 125
In Plaintiﬀ M61/2010E v Commonwealth (‘Oﬀshore Processing Case’), the
High Court was clear that a statutory power to detain a person could not permit
the continuation of that detention at the unconstrained discretion of the executive. 126 at case dealt with the procedures established to assess the asylum
claims of ‘oﬀshore entry persons’ on Christmas Island by the Rudd Labor government. 127 Upon request, an ‘oﬀshore entry person’ could have their protection claims assessed through the Refugee Status Assessment (‘RSA’) process,
and seek Independent Merits Review (‘IMR’) of negative rulings. ese procedures were established outside the Migration Act with the government claiming
that they were an exercise of the non-prerogative executive power to enquire. 128
is, the government claimed, meant that there was no obligation to aﬀord procedural fairness. Nor did it matter if those who were making the inquiry misunderstood or misapplied the law. Such a characterisation was rejected by the
High Court, which found that the process was linked to the statutory discretion
given to the Minister to li the bar preventing oﬀshore entry persons from submitting a protection visa application. 129 Key to this finding was the fact that the
Migration Act required the detention of an ‘oﬀshore entry person’ for the duration of the RSA and IMR processes. 130 Such detention could not be carried out
and continue at the ‘unconstrained discretion’ of the executive. 131 us, the assessment and review had to be construed as having a statutory footing.
e High Court’s finding as to the need for a statutory basis for procedures
which extend the period for which a person is detained has significant
124
125
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127

128
129
130
131

Migration Act (n 15) s 36; Migration Regulations (n 15) sch 1 pt 4 regs 1403–4.
ough the government has no statutory power to apply the entry screening procedures, it
does have the statutory power to allow an individual to lodge a protection visa application. To
the extent that a conflict exists between the statutory protection regime and the statutory visa
cancellation and removal regime, the DHA could prioritise protection over visa cancellation
and removal. However, with entry screening, the DHA eﬀectively attempts to create a process
that allows the Department to choose when to prioritise protection and when to prioritise visa
cancellation and removal, without any meaningful oversight or statutory basis.
(2010) 243 CLR 319, 348 [68] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and
Bell JJ) (‘Oﬀshore Processing Case’).
For a detailed examination of this policy and the Oﬀshore Processing Case (n 126), see generally
Mary Crock and Daniel Ghezelbash, ‘Due Process and Rule of Law as Human Rights: e High
Court and the “Oﬀshore” Processing of Asylum Seekers’ (2011) 18(2) Australian Journal of
Administrative Law 101.
Oﬀshore Processing Case (n 126) 336 [15].
Ibid 348 [62]. ese discretions were found in ss 46A(2) and 195A of the Migration Act (n 15).
All unlawful non-citizens are mandatorily detained under s 189 of the Migration Act (n 15).
Oﬀshore Processing Case (n 126) 348 [63].
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ramifications for the current analysis. It precludes the government from claiming, as it did in the Oﬀshore Processing Case that entry screening is being carried
out pursuant to a non-statutory executive power to enquire. It also explains the
attempt in the Entry Screening Guidelines to link the entry screening process to
the statutory duty to remove a person under s 198(2). 132 As has been demonstrated, this claim does not withstand scrutiny. is results in a significant difference between the procedures examined in the Oﬀshore Processing Case when
compared to the entry screening procedures in question here. Oﬀshore entry
persons (now UMAs) faced an explicit statutory bar to making a valid protection visa application, 133 linked to an explicit discretionary power vested in the
Minister to decide to li that bar. 134 e High Court thus construed the RSA
and IMR procedures as informing the decision of whether or not to exercise
that statutory discretionary power.
e entry screening procedures rest upon shakier statutory footing. UAAs
face no statutory bar preventing them from applying for either a TPV or SHEV.
Nor does the Minister, or anyone else, possess any explicit statutory discretion
to determine whether an individual can make a valid protection visa application or be provided with the facilities to do so. Yet this is precisely the power
which the entry screening procedures appear to inform. Entry screening stems
from the omission of a statutory duty to provide an individual with advice and
facilities to make a visa application, in the absence of an express and precise
request. It is unlikely that an omission can validly authorise screening procedures, particularly given that the procedures extend the duration for which a
person is detained. Any assessments undertaken that extend the time that a
person is detained must have some sort of statutory footing. is does not appear to be the case with the entry screening procedures, potentially rendering
the procedures and the period of detention during which they are undertaken
as unlawful.
C Ignoring or Misapplying the Procedures
ough questions exist as to the validity of the entry screening procedures,
were they found to be lawful, additional limited avenues for judicial review
might arise where the procedures were not properly followed in an individual
case. While policies do not bind decision-makers in the same way as
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Entry Screening Guidelines (n 27) 3.
Migration Act (n 15) s 46A(1).
Ibid s 46A(2).
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legislation, 135 they can have legal significance. e courts have indicated a number of circumstances where a breach or misapplication of a non-statutory policy
may amount to jurisdictional error. 136 e relevant grounds for challenge include: (1) where the policy constitutes a mandatory relevant consideration, (2)
where the policy is misapplied or misconstrued in a manner which renders a
decision legally unreasonable, or (3) where a departure from the policy constitutes a breach of procedural fairness.
It may be possible to frame the content of the entry screening procedures as
mandatory relevant considerations that the screening oﬃcer must take into account. In Nikac v Minister for Immigration, Wilcox J explained that even if a
non-statutory policy is not binding on a decision-maker, ‘in the sense that
[they] may decide in the particular case not to act in accordance with that policy, a policy applicable to the case is always a relevant consideration in the making of a decision.’ 137 Courts have been receptive to such an argument in a number of cases related to migration decision-making. In Minister for Immigration,
Local Government and Ethnic Aﬀairs v Gray (‘Gray’), a majority of the Federal
Court found that ministerial policy statements relating to the deportation of
criminal non-citizens ‘were relevant factors which the [decision-maker] was
bound to consider although not bound to apply so as to prejudice its independent assessment of the merits of the case.’ 138 A similar argument was put forward
in Khan v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, with respect to the considerations set out in the Department of Immigration and Citizenship’s ‘Procedures Advice Manual’. 139 While the Court sidestepped directly addressing this
question of whether the considerations in the manual were binding, the judges
le the door open to such a finding. 140
A second approach would be to argue that a misapplication of the policy
gives rise to an error of law on the grounds of unreasonableness. ere is a
common law presumption that statutory powers are to be exercised reasonably. 141 A conclusion of unreasonableness can be outcome focused, occurring
135
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140
141

Lawful policy ‘guides but does not control the making of decisions’ such that the individual
merits of a case cannot be considered: Drake [No 2] (n 54) 641 (Brennan J).
e circumstances where this may eventuate are far from settled. For a detailed examination
of this issue, see Greg Weeks, ‘e Use and Enforcement of So Law by Australian Public Authorities’ (2014) 42(1) Federal Law Review 1.
(1988) 20 FCR 65, 81.
(1994) 50 FCR 189, 221 (French and Drummond JJ) (‘Gray’).
(2011) 192 FCR 173, 191 [71]–[72] (Flick J).
Ibid 178 [15] (Buchanan J), 195 [84] (Flick J).
See, eg, Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223;
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332, 362 [63] (Hayne, Kiefel and
Bell JJ) (‘Li’).
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where there is no ‘evident and intelligible justification’ for the decision. 142 Alternatively, legal unreasonableness may lie in an error in the decision-making
process. 143 In the present context, this may occur where the screening oﬃcer
purports to apply the entry screening procedures as the ‘proper basis for disposing of the case in hand, but misconstrues or misunderstands [the policy] so
what is applied is not the policy but something else.’ 144 is can be viewed as an
example of ‘an illogicality in, or misapplication of, the reasoning adopted by the
decision-maker; so the factual result is perverse, by the decision-maker’s own
criteria’. 145 Regardless of whether the focus is on the outcome or procedures
followed, for a challenge based on legal unreasonableness to succeed, a court
would need to be satisfied that the decision was beyond power, having regard
to the scope, purpose and objects of the relevant statutory provisions. 146 is
would turn on identifying and construing the relevant statutory power being
exercised in the screening procedures — a power which we argue does not exist
in the Migration Act. 147 e exercise of non-statutory powers may also be challenged on the grounds of legal unreasonableness. us, if a court was to disagree with our analysis, and find that procedures are validly authorised under a
non-statutory power, review on the grounds of unreasonableness may still
be available. 148
A third approach might frame a departure from the entry screening procedures as a breach of procedural fairness. In Applicants M16 of 2004 v Minister
for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Aﬀairs, Gray J considered the
‘gender guidelines’ issued by the Minister which set out procedures for dealing
with gender-related claims by asylum seekers. 149 His Honour found that the
failure of the Refugee Review Tribunal (‘RRT’) to apply the guidelines in that
142
143
144
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Li (n 141) 367 [76], quoted in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018)
264 CLR 541, 573 [82] (Nettle and Gordon JJ).
Li (n 141) 365–6 [72].
Gray (n 138) 208, finding that the departure from non-statutory guidelines that the decisionmaker purported to rely on was an error of law.
Taveli v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Aﬀairs (1989) 86 ALR 435, 453
(Wilcox J), quoted in Jabbour v Secretary of the Department of Home Aﬀairs (2019) 369 ALR
620, 638 [89] (Robertson J) (‘Jabbour’).
Li (n 141) 363–4 [67], citing Klein v Domus Pty Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 467, 473 (Dixon CJ).
See above Part III(B).
Jabbour (n 145) 640 [101]:
It would seem to me to be incongruous to have in the common law a principle of statutory
interpretation implying reasonableness as a condition of the exercise of a discretionary
power conferred by statute, but not to have in the common law any such principle existing
outside statutory interpretation.
(2005) 148 FCR 46, 56–60 [37]–[53].
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case amounted to a breach of procedural fairness. 150 e guidelines indicated
what procedurally fair steps were required to be taken. Justice Gray found they
must be followed for the RRT to aﬀord a ‘proper opportunity’ to an applicant
to present information regarding their claim. 151 erefore, even if a court is
unwilling to construe the entry screening procedures as creating hard legal requirements, a departure from them may give rise to grounds for judicial review.
D Procedural Fairness
e question of whether procedural fairness considerations beyond those expressly identified in the entry screening procedures apply in the entry screening
context, as well as the content of that requirement, turns on the construction of
the source of power being exercised. If the government’s contention is correct,
and the procedures are construed as informing a decision under s 198(2) of the
Migration Act, 152 the rules of procedural fairness will likely apply. Where a statute confers power to ‘destroy, defeat or prejudice a person’s rights [or] interests’
the principles of natural justice generally apply. 153 A failure to adhere to those
requirements may amount to a jurisdictional error amenable to judicial review.
In the Oﬀshore Processing Case, the High Court made clear that screening procedures which prolonged the detention of persons subject to them aﬀected their
rights and interests in way which entitled them to be aﬀorded procedural fairness. 154 In that case, inquiries undertaken in an RSA, and any subsequent IMR,
prolonged the detention of the applicants for as long as the assessment took to
complete. 155 e airport entry screening procedures similarly have the consequence of depriving individuals ‘of their liberty for longer than would otherwise
have been the case.’ 156 e rules of procedural fairness thus apply, a denial of
which will result in a decision made in excess of jurisdiction, unless the duty to
observe procedural fairness is excluded by words of necessary intendment. 157
In order to exclude considerations of natural justice (or procedural fairness)
the legislative intention must appear ‘from express words of plain
150
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Ibid 59 [49]–[50].
Ibid 59 [50].
Entry Screening Guidelines (n 27) 3.
Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596, 598 (Mason CJ, Deane and McHugh JJ).
Oﬀshore Processing Case (n 126) 352–3 [75]–[76] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon,
Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
Ibid 353 [76].
Ibid.
See, eg, Kioa (n 12) 585 (Mason J), 615–16 (Brennan J), 632 (Deane J); Commissioner of
Police v Tanos (1958) 98 CLR 383, 395–6 (Dixon CJ and Webb J) (‘Tanos’).
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intendment.’ 158 e Migration Act contains a number of provisions expressly
limiting the scope of natural justice to certain decisions made under the Act.
ese provisions cover decisions to grant or refuse visas, 159 cancel visas, 160 and
the conduct of merits review. 161 However, no such provisions exist in relation
to decisions to allow a person to lodge a visa application. Nor do any provisions
cover a decision about whether to remove an unlawful non‐citizen under s
198(2), which the government claims the entry screening process informs.
Given that there are no express words of plain intendment excluding natural
justice, common law rules of procedural fairness would apply and ‘consideration must proceed by reference to correct legal principles, correctly applied.’ 162
ough the concept of procedural fairness does not have a fixed meaning,
‘[f]airness is not an abstract concept’ and the ‘concern of the law is to avoid
practical injustice’. 163 In Plaintiﬀ S157, Gleeson CJ identified the ‘essential elements’ as ‘fairness and detachment’. 164 One rule of procedural fairness, the
hearing rule, has particular resonance in the context of the entry screening process and generally requires that an individual be aﬀorded prior notice, 165 that
the government disclose certain information and allow the individual to respond, 166 and that the individual has a reasonable opportunity to present their
case. 167 Each requirement is addressed as to the entry screening process, in
turn.
First, persons subject to entry screening procedures must be given notice
that a decision will be made and provided with suﬃcient time to prepare their
case. e amount of notice required will vary depending on the circumstances.
158
159
160
161
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Tanos (n 157). Such an intention ‘is not to be assumed nor is it to be spelled out from indirect
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Migration Act (n 15) s 51A.
Ibid ss 97A, 118A, 127A.
Ibid ss 422B (review of protection visa decisions), 357A (review of other visa decisions), 473DA
(review of fast-track decisions).
Oﬀshore Processing Case (n 126) 354 [78].
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Aﬀairs and Indigenous Aﬀairs; Ex parte Lam
(2003) 214 CLR 1, 14 [37] (Gleeson CJ). is ‘derives from the recognition of the importance
of the process of the exercise of state power and not just the correctness of the outcome’:
SZRMQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 142, [8] (Allsop CJ)
(emphasis in original).
Plaintiﬀ S157 (n 108) 490 [25].
R v Small Claims Tribunal; Ex parte Cameron [1976] VR 427, 432 (Anderson J); Traill v McRae
(2002) 122 FCR 349, 380 [134] (Sackville, Kenny and Allsop JJ).
Kirk (n 110) 557–8 [26] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Kioa (n
12) 629 (Brennan J).
Jamal v DPP (NSW) [2013] NSWCA 355, [54] (Gleeson JA).
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However, the lack of notice or time to prepare provided for in either the Entry
Screening Guidelines or the Protection Claims at the Border Instruction would
likely be unacceptable. is is particularly given the fact that there is a strong
presumption that appropriate notice will be provided to an individual where
liberty is at stake. 168 Second, there must be disclosure of the substance of the
information on which the decision is being made and an opportunity to respond to this information. 169 In particular, ‘an opportunity should be given to
deal with adverse information that is credible, relevant and significant to the
decision to be made’. 170 is would extend, as it did in the Oﬀshore Processing
Case to a requirement to give claimants an opportunity to respond to adverse
country information. 171 Finally, the individual must be given a reasonable opportunity to place relevant information before a decision-maker. 172 e Entry
Screening Guidelines and the Protection Claims at the Border Instruction do not
appear to meet any of these requirements and likely do not provide the necessary degree of fairness and detachment required by natural justice to individuals subject to the entry screening process.
I V I N T E R NAT I O NA L L AW I M P L I C AT I O N S
Having considered the shortcomings of the entry screening process under the
domestic legal framework, Part IV considers the practices and policies under
international law. ough the focus of this Part fixes primarily upon obligations
contained in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (‘1951 Convention’) and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (‘1967 Protocol’), which
form the basis of the international legal framework governing refugees and to
which Australia is a party, other human rights instruments and customary international law bear upon the issues discussed. While Australia has attracted
condemnation for violations of international law in relation to oﬀshore
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See, eg, Sales v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Aﬀairs [2006] FCA 1807, [33]
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notice to cancel a permanent visa. See also Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v
SZSSJ (2016) 259 CLR 180, 207 [83] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and
Gordon JJ).
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processing and interdiction, 173 less attention has been paid to its interception
policies within Australian airports. However, Australia is not alone in its use of
airport transit zones to prevent refugees from seeking asylum and the UNHCR
has expressed concern about the growing use of such zones. 174
Claims from states that people intercepted within transit areas are outside
of their jurisdiction, and thus responsibility, 175 has no basis in international law
which recognises a state’s competence and responsibility over the entirety of its
territory. 176 States are responsible for ensuring protection from refoulement ‘to
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’ 177 e UNHCR
has held that
[t]he term ‘territory’ includes a state’s land territory and territorial waters as well
as its de jure border entry points, including transit areas or ‘international’ zones
at airports. A state’s responsibility to protect persons from refoulement is regardless of whether the person has entered the country in a [domestic] legal sense
and has passed immigration control, was authorized to enter, or is located in the
transit areas or ‘international’ zone of an airport. 178

173

174

175
176
177

178

See, eg, Michelle Bachelet, ‘Opening Statement by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
Michelle Bachelet’ (Speech, 39th Session of the Human Rights Council, 10 September 2018)
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23518&LangID
=E>; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding Observations on the Eighth Periodic Report of Australia, UN Doc CEDAW/C/AUS/CO/8 (20 July 2018)
16–17 [53].
Legal Considerations regarding Air Arrivals (n 47) 1:
UNHCR is aware of instances of persons seeking international protection not being able
to make asylum claims upon their arrival at airports. ey are stopped in the transit area
or ‘international’ zone before being removed and returned to territories where their lives
or freedom are threatened, irrespective of whether they have had the opportunity to express a fear of returning to face a risk of persecution or other forms of serious harm to
immigration or other oﬃcials at the airport.
Hathaway (n 33) 298.
ICCPR (n 11) art 2.
Ibid. is point touches upon a deeper-rooted argument regarding state responsibility to protect the human rights of all persons within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction,
which falls beyond the scope of this article.
Legal Considerations regarding Air Arrivals (n 47) 2–3 (citations omitted). See Amuur v France
[1996] III Eur Court HR 1, 15 [26], in which the French Government attempted to claim that
asylum seekers detained ‘in a so-called international zone at the airport’ were ‘not yet on
French territory and the French authorities are therefore not under a legal obligation to examine the request’ for asylum. e European Court of Human Rights rejected this argument,
finding that ‘even though the applicants were not in France within the meaning of the Ordinance of 2 November 1945, holding them in the international zone … made them subject to
French law. Despite its name, the international zone does not have extraterritorial status’: at

2020]

Assessing Refugee Protection Claims at Australian Airports

197

As such, Australia’s international legal obligations apply within immigration
clearance, just as they do anywhere else within its territory or under
its jurisdiction.
Part IV begins with an examination of the fundamental obligation of nonrefoulement, which requires fair and eﬀective assessment of refugee claims and
access to legal representation. e Part then turns to an analysis of whether
three aspects of the entry screening process — visa cancellation, visa class restriction, and detention — violate the prohibition on penalisation of refugees.
Australia’s attempt to implement its international legal obligations through the
construction of a transnational system consisting of domestic legislation, regulation, and policy guidance must be evaluated having particular regard to the
obligations of non-refoulement and non-penalisation, which play a central role
in the design and function of the international system of refugee protection. 179
A Non-Refoulement
Australia has non-refoulement obligations by virtue of its accession to the 1951
Convention and 1967 Protocol, its ratification of various human rights treaties, 180 as well as under customary international law. 181 ese obligations prohibit the return or removal of asylum seekers to places where they risk persecution or harm. e term ‘non-refoulement’ has expanded beyond its use as a
term of art in the 1951 Convention to ‘encapsulate the protection obligations
that arise in similar, if related contexts’ and possesses a normative grounding in
humanitarian, refugee, and human rights law. 182 However, art 33(1) of the 1951
Convention provides the typical starting place for understanding the prohibition on returning a refugee

179
180
181
182

25 [52]. As provided in Statute of the Oﬃce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, GA Res 428(V), UN Doc A/RES/428(V) (14 December 1950), and strengthened by subsequent General Assembly Resolutions and the 1967 Protocol (n 11), UNHCR’s core mandate
includes ‘providing international protection, under the auspices of the United Nations, to refugees who fall within the scope of the present Statute and of seeking permanent solutions for the
problem of refugees.’ (emphasis added). is core mandate requires UNHCR to supervise the
application of the 1951 Convention (n 11) and 1967 Protocol (n 11), which includes providing
legal analysis and commentaries on national law, among other things, to assist policy and decision makers in ensuring that domestic law comports with obligations under international
law.
Questions regarding the consequences of a state’s breach of international law obligations are
beyond the scope of this article.
See above n 11 and accompanying text.
See above n 14 and accompanying text.
Goodwin-Gill, ‘Non-Refoulement and Temporary Refuge’ (n 14) 440.
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to the frontiers of territories where [their] life or freedom would be threatened
on account of [their] race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion. 183

Article 33 also ‘prohibits, without discrimination, any state conduct leading to
the “return in any manner whatsoever” to an unsafe foreign territory, including
rejection at the frontier or non-admission to the territory.’ 184 e prohibition
on return found in the 1951 Convention, the 1967 Protocol, various other human rights instruments, and customary international law includes an obligation that states provide admission ‘at least on a temporary basis’ to those fleeing
serious harm. 185 e UNHCR has observed that where states ‘intensify and coordinate their eﬀorts to curb irregular immigration, there is a danger that the
legal and administrative measures adopted’ may lead to refoulement. 186 Finally,
under both the 1951 Convention and international human rights law, states are
not only prohibited from returning a refugee to any territory where they may
face persecution, but also to a territory where there is a real risk they would face
other forms of serious harm. 187 is Part examines whether Australia’s policy
of entry screening allows for the fair and eﬀective assessment of protection
claims and access to legal representation, thus reducing the risk of breach of the
obligation of non-refoulement.

183
184

185

186
187

1951 Convention (n 11) art 33(1).
Legal Considerations regarding Air Arrivals (n 47) 2 (citations omitted), quoting Executive
Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Addendum to the Report of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Conclusion on Safeguarding Asylum, UN DOC
A/52/12/ADD.1 (3 November 1977) 8 (‘Conclusion on Safeguarding Asylum’).
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Report of the Executive Committee for the Programme of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on the Work of
Its irty-Second Session: Conclusions of the Committee — Protection of Asylum-Seekers in Situations of Large-Scale Influx, UN DOC A/36/12/ADD.1 (21 October 1981) 18. Goodwin-Gill,
‘Non-Refoulement, Temporary Refuge, and the “New” Asylum Seekers’ (n 14) 457–8.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Note on International Protection, UN
GAOR, UN Doc A/AC.96/815 (31 August 1993) 6 [14].
Lauterpacht and Bethlehem (n 14) 122 (emphasis in original): ‘e evident import of this is
that refoulement is prohibited to the frontiers of any territory … regardless of whether those
territories are the country of origin of the person concerned.’ See also Goodwin-Gill and
McAdam (n 14); Cathryn Costello and Michelle Foster, ‘Non-Refoulement as Custom and Jus
Cogens?: Putting the Prohibition to the Test’ in Maarten den Heijer and Harmen van der Wilt
(eds), Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 2015: Jus Cogens (Asser Press, 2015) vol 46,
273, 284–6; Jane McAdam, ‘Australian Complementary Protection: A Step-by-Step Approach’
(2011) 33(4) Sydney Law Review 687, 693–4.
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1 Fair and Eﬀective Assessment
As already highlighted, states have a duty to persons on their territory. is duty
requires the state in question ‘to make independent inquiries as to the persons’
need for international protection and to ensure they are not at risk of refoulement’. 188 e UNHCR has concluded that at a minimum, these status determinations must be both fair and eﬀective. 189 is requirement stems both
from the principle of non-refoulement and the obligation to implement and
interpret the provisions of the 1951 Convention in a manner consistent with its
object and purpose. 190 e object and purpose of the 1951 Convention is the
protection of refugees. 191 Without access to fair and eﬀective procedures for
deciding protection claims, Australia cannot know whether an individual is a
refugee requiring protection as mandated by the 1951 Convention or the human
rights instruments discussed above. 192 is determination is critical to ensuring compliance with the obligation of non-refoulement.
188
189

190
191
192

Legal Considerations regarding Air Arrivals (n 47) 3 [6].
See, eg, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Addendum to the Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: General Conclusion on International
Protection, UN Doc A/52/12/ADD.1 (3 November 1997) 5–6; ‘Conclusion on Safeguarding
Asylum’ (n 184) 8; Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Addendum
to the Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Conclusion on International
Protection’, UN Doc A/53/12/ADD.1 (30 October 1998) 8; Executive Committee of the High
Commissioner’s Programme, Report of the Fiy-ird Session of the Executive Committee of the
High Commissioner’s Programme: Conclusion on Reception of Asylum-Seekers in the Context of
Individual Asylum Systems, UN Doc A/AC.96/973 (8 October 2002) 9; Executive Committee
of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Report of the Fiy-Fih Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme: General Conclusion on International Protection,
UN Doc A/AC.96/1003 (12 October 2004) 9; Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Report of the Fiy-Sixth Session of the Executive Committee of the High
Commissioner’s Programme: Conclusion on the Provision on International Protection Including
through Complementary Forms of Protection, UN Doc A/AC.96/1021 (7 October 2005) 14; Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Report of the Sixty-First Session
of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme: Conclusion on Refugees with
Disabilities and Other Persons with Disabilities Protected and Assisted by UNHCR, UN Doc
A/AC.96/1095 (12 October 2010) 7.
VCLT (n 47) arts 26, 31.
1951 Convention (n 11) Preamble para 3.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Global Consultations on International Protection: Asylum Processes (Fair and Eﬃcient Asylum Procedures), UN Doc EC/GC/01/02 (31
May 2001) 2 [5] (‘Global Consultations on Fair and Eﬃcient Asylum Procedures’): ‘Fair and
eﬃcient procedures are an essential element in the full and inclusive application of the [1951
Convention]. ey enable a State to identify those who would benefit from international protection … and those who should not.’ See also Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Addendum to the Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: General Conclusion on International Protection, UN Doc A/46/12/ADD.1 (29 January
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ough states have a degree of discretion in how they design their asylum
procedures, minimum procedural requirements should be guided by obligations derived from international treaties, international human rights law and
humanitarian law, and Conclusions adopted by UNHCR’s Executive Committee, of which Australia has long been a member. 193 is requires that:
(i) e competent oﬃcial (eg an immigration oﬃcer or border police oﬃcer) should
have clear instructions for dealing with international protection issues, be required to act in accordance with the principle of non-refoulement and refer such
cases to a central authority responsible for asylum.
(ii) e applicant should receive necessary guidance as to the procedure to be followed in order to raise or lodge a protection claim.
(iii) ere should be a clearly identified central authority with responsibility for examining requests for refugee status and taking a decision in the first instance.
Enforcement oﬃcials at airports should not be responsible for assessing the substance of the claim.
(iv) e applicant should be given the necessary facilities, including prompt access
to legal assistance on request and the services of a competent interpreter, for submitting their case to the authorities. Applicants should also be given the opportunity, of which they should be informed, to contact a representative of the
UNHCR.
(v) If the applicant is recognised as a refugee, they should be informed accordingly
and issued with documentation certifying their refugee status.
(vi) If the applicant is not recognised, they should be given a reasonable time to appeal to an authority diﬀerent from and independent of that making the initial
decision, whether administrative or judicial, according to the prevailing system.

193

1992) 7–8; Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Addendum to the
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: General Conclusion on International Protection, UN Doc A/48/12/ADD.1 (19 October 1993) 9; Executive Committee of the
High Commissioner’s Programme, Addendum to the Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: General Conclusion on International Protection, UN Doc
A/49/12/ADD.1 (20 October 1994) 9–10.
Regina Jeﬀeries, Daniel Ghezelbash and Asher Hirsch, Assessing Protection Claims at Airports:
Developing Procedures to Meet International and Domestic Obligations (Policy Brief No 9, September 2020) 10–11.
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(vii) e applicant should be permitted to remain in the country pending a decision
on their initial request and review, as well as any judicial or administrative
appeal. 194

Originally formulated by the UNHCR Executive Committee (in 1975), this list
has been updated to reflect an evolving understanding of minimum procedural
requirements, particularly in reference to developments international human
rights law. 195
ese elements are absent from the screening procedures at Australian airports. First, as discussed above in Part III, asylum seekers intercepted at an Australian airport are oen given limited time to make a protection application and
may be removed from Australia before an application can be made. Second,
while a preliminary interview within the airport does take place, there is no
evidence such an interview is comprehensive, nor if a person has a proper understanding of the questions being asked of them or the legal significance of
such questions. ird, an asylum seeker has no chance to address any adverse
information and provide evidence of their claim, especially within the short
timeframes before removal. Fourth, no written reasons are provided to the asylum seeker before removal as to why they have not met Australia’s protection
obligations. Fih, there is no chance available for asylum seekers within Australian airports to challenge the merits of their negative decision, as discussed
above. Sixth, judicial review may be impractical due to limited access to lawyers
and the practicalities of being detained. Finally, there is no free legal advice
provided, and no onus on the DHA to provide access to a lawyer unless formally
requested by the asylum seeker. e deficiencies in the process means that Australia may fail to identify protection claims, and as a result risks breaching its
non-refoulement obligations by returning or removing individuals to locations
where there is a real risk they would face persecution or other forms of
serious harm.
194

195

See ibid; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Conclusions on International Protection: Adopted by the Executive Committee of the UNHCR, UN DOC
HCR/IP/3/Eng/REV.2017 (October 2017); Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s
Programme, Addendum to the Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees:
Conclusions of the Committee — Determination of Refugee Status, UN Doc A/32/12/Add.1 (31
October 1977) 14–16 [6(e)]; Global Consultations on Fair and Eﬃcient Asylum Procedures, UN
Doc EC/GC/01/02 (n 192) 10 [43]; Hirsi Jamaa v Italy [2012] I Eur Court HR 97, 172, 179–80
(Judge Albuquerque) (‘Hirsi Jamaa’); Kaldor Centre Principles for Australian Refugee Policy
(Andrew and Renata Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, June 2019) 9–10. See also
Madeline Gleeson, Where to from Here?: Report from the Expert Roundtable on Regional Cooperation and Refugee Protection in the Asia-Pacific (Report, Andrew and Renata Kaldor Centre
for International Refugee Law, December 2016) 18–19.
Global Consultations on Fair and Eﬃcient Asylum Procedures, UN Doc EC/GC/01/02 (n 192)
10 [43]; Hirsi Jamaa (n 194) 172, 179–80; Gleeson (n 194) 18–19.

202

Melbourne University Law Review

[Vol 44(1):162

2 Access to Legal Representation
Access to legal assistance is a key feature of a fair and eﬀective status determination procedure and stems from the non-refoulement obligation whereby
Australia accurately identifies those in need of protection. As the UNHCR has
concluded:
Asylum-seekers are oen unable to articulate the elements relevant to an asylum
claim without the assistance of a qualified counsellor because they are not familiar with the precise grounds for the recognition of refugee status and the legal
system of a foreign country. Quality legal assistance and representation is, moreover, in the interest of states, as it can help to ensure that international protection
needs are properly identified. 196

Likewise, in terms of the non-refoulement obligation under the ICCPR, the
United Nations Human Rights Committee has held, in the context of France,
that ‘asylum-seekers must be properly informed and assured of their rights, including the right to apply for asylum, with access to free legal aid.’ 197 Access to
legal advice is not unfamiliar elsewhere in international law. e ECtHR has
held that access is required by art 13 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. 198 In ND v Spain, the Court found that the collective expulsion of asylum seekers to Morocco by Spanish oﬃcials violated art 13 as
the applicants were turned back immediately by the border authorities and had
no access to an interpreter or to any oﬃcial who could provide them with the
minimum amount of information required with regard to the right of asylum
and/or the relevant procedure for appealing against their expulsion. 199

As discussed above, if asylum seekers at Australian airports are not given access
to a lawyer, the policy may run afoul of both domestic law and Australia’s international legal obligations. Without legal assistance, individuals at risk of persecution may be unaware of their rights or unable to articulate their claims. As
such, they may be removed from Australia to locations where they face harm
contrary to the non-refoulement obligation under international law.

196

197
198
199

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Fair and Eﬃcient Asylum Procedures: A
Non-Exhaustive Overview of Applicable International Standards’ (Position Paper, 2 September
2005) 3 <https://www.refworld.org/docid/432ae9204.html>.
Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article
40 of the Covenant: France, UN Doc CCPR/C/FRA/CO/4 (22 July 2008) 6 [20].
See, eg, Abdolkhani v Turkey [2009] II Eur Court HR 1, 34 [115].
ND v Spain (European Court of Human Rights, ird Section, Application Nos 8675/15 and
8697/15, 3 October 2017) [120].
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B Non-Penalisation
Article 31 of the 1951 Convention prevents states from imposing penalties on
refugees on account of their illegal entry or presence. 200 e language of art 31
delineates state obligations, while specifying conditions incumbent upon a refugee which qualify the obligations:
1. e Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their
life or freedom was threatened … provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.
2. e Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of such refugees restrictions other than those which are necessary … e Contracting States shall
allow such refugees a reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain
admission into another country. 201

erefore, an analysis of Australian policy in light of art 31 requires consideration not only of whether state action constitutes a ‘penalty’ under art 31(1) but
whether restrictions on movement (such as detention) are ‘necessary’ and applied for the limited time specified in art 31(2). e inquiry further requires a
look at the conditions of entitlement to protection, including who benefits and
whether they have met the conditions of ‘coming directly’, entry or presence in
the territory ‘without authorization,’ presenting themselves ‘without delay’, and
showing ‘good cause for their illegal entry or presence.’ 202 is Part begins with
an examination of the scope of protection under art 31 and whether the phrase
‘on refugees’ encompasses individuals who arrive in Australia by air and raise
protection claims. 203 We then turn to an analysis of the limiting conditions of
art 31, before examining whether Australia’s policies of visa cancellation, visa
class restriction, and detention constitute penalties prohibited by art 31, particularly as the exercise of state jurisdiction in the entry screening process occurs
before an examination of the claim to refugee status.
As the UNHCR has noted, the prohibition on penalties for illegal entry extends to ‘refugees’ and has been recognised in international law to include asylum seekers, in accordance with the principle of good faith and full and eﬀective

200
201
202
203

1951 Convention (n 11) art 31.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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implementation of international legal obligations. 204 e principle of non-refoulement in the 1951 Convention applies to any person who meets the refugee
definition and does not fall within the scope of the exclusion provisions. 205 Refugee status is thus declaratory in nature, whereby ‘[a] person is a refugee within
the meaning of the 1951 Convention as soon as [they fulfil] the criteria contained in the definition.’ 206 An individual therefore becomes a refugee prior to
the moment when their refugee status is formally recognised. 207 As GoodwinGill observes, ‘this provision would be devoid of all eﬀect unless it also extended, at least over a certain time, to asylum seekers or … to “presumptive
refugees”’. 208 Many of the States Parties to the 1951 Convention and/or 1967
Protocol have agreed and incorporated this understanding in their national legislation, case law, and practice. 209 ough Australia voluntarily accepted the international legal obligation of non-penalisation by becoming a party to the
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, the government has not taken steps to
make that obligation eﬀective under domestic law. 210 Regardless of the degree
of incorporation into domestic law, Australia owes a duty of non-penalisation
204

205
206

207
208

209

210

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial
Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol’ (Position Paper, 26 January 2007) 2–3 [6]
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/45f17a1a4.html>.
Ibid.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection: Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, UN Doc
HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.4 (February 2019) 17 [28] (‘UNHCR Handbook’). See also James C
Hathaway and Michelle Foster, e Law of Refugee Status (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed,
2014) 25.
UNHCR Handbook, UN Doc HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.4 (n 206) 17 [28].
Guy S Goodwin-Gill, ‘Article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees:
Non-Penalization, Detention and Protection’ (Discussion Paper, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Global Consultations, October 2001) 8 [27] (‘Article 31 of the 1951
Convention Discussion Paper’), quoting R v Uxbridge Magistrates’ Court; Ex parte Adimi [2001]
QB 667, 677 (Simon Brown LJ) (‘Ex parte Adimi’). Without a fair and eﬃcient determination
as to whether a person meets the refugee criteria, a state cannot know whether an asylum
seeker is, in fact, a refugee. As a result, where a state penalises asylum seekers (who may also
be refugees), the art 31 prohibition on penalisation of refugees would be undermined: see
above n 192 and accompanying text. See also Global Consultations on Fair and Eﬃcient Asylum
Procedures, UN Doc EC/GC/01/02 (n 192) 2 [5].
For a discussion of more recent state practice, see United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Roundtable on Non-Penalization for Illegal Entry or Presence: Interpreting and Applying
Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention (Roundtable, 15 March 2017)
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b18f6740.html> (‘Roundtable on Non-Penalization’).
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Aﬀairs v Ah Hin Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 at 287. Cf VCLT
(n 47) art 26; Hathaway and Foster (n 206) 28–30.
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under international law to refugees and asylum seekers falling within the ambit
of art 31 until a final decision has been made in a fair procedure, finding them
not to be refugees. 211
e next question relates to whether individuals who make protection
claims at or before immigration clearance in Australian airports can be said to
fall within the definition of refugee or asylum seeker. e answer to this inquiry
is straightforward. As travellers raising protection claims at or before immigration clearance cannot be said to have received a decision on the merits of their
claim to refugee status, these individuals would be considered asylum seekers.
As outlined above, the declaratory nature of refugee status dictates that an asylum seeker may be a refugee regardless of whether Australia has formally recognised that status. Travellers seeking protection at Australian airports clearly
fall within the personal scope of art 31. Yet art 31 still requires an analysis of
whether air arrivals who make protection claims meet the conditions of ‘coming directly’, entry or presence in ‘territory without authorization’, presenting
‘without delay’, and showing ‘good cause for their illegal entry or presence’. 212
An inquiry into these conditions requires an individual analysis of each
case; something missing from — and precluded in practice by — the entry
screening process. 213 Regardless, few travellers would likely be le outside
art 31’s protective scope, due to the meanings attached to each of the phrases
under international law. First, ‘coming directly’ does not require direct flight
from the country of origin (or residence) and instead refers to any territory
where their ‘life or freedom was threatened in the sense of art 1’. 214 e phrase
has been interpreted narrowly to include only those refugees ‘who found asylum, or who were settled, temporarily or permanently, in another country.’ 215
211

212
213

214
215

See also ‘Roundtable on Non-Penalization’ (n 209) 4 [7]:
For [art 31(1)] to be eﬀective, it must apply to any person who is or claims to be in need of
international protection, and it must only cease to apply once a decision-maker issues a
final decision, aer following a fair procedure, holding otherwise.
1951 Convention (n 11) art 31.
See also Cathryn Costello, Yulia Ioﬀe, and Teresa Büchsel, Legal and Protection Policy Research
Series, Article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, UN Doc
PPLA/2017/01 (Policy Paper, July 2017) 20 (‘Legal and Protection Policy Paper’):
e provision is inherently concerned with the refugee’s individual predicament, and the
trio of interrelated conditions, ‘good cause’, ‘without delay’ and ‘coming directly’ related to
bona fides, and so ought to be interpreted consistently to take into account the reality of
refugees’ flight conditions and the types of barriers they encounter.
Ibid, quoting 1951 Convention (n 11) art 31(1).
Legal and Protection Policy Paper, UN Doc PPLA/2017/01 (n 213) 19, quoting Expert
Roundtable, ‘Summary Conclusions: Article 31 of the 1951 Convention’ in Erika Feller, Volker
Türk and Frances Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global
Consultations on International Protection (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 253, 255.
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e major transit countries for asylum seekers attempting to reach Australia
are not signatories to the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol and may independently pose an actual or potential threat to the asylum seeker’s life or freedom. It is therefore highly unlikely that the ‘coming directly’ requirement
would preclude UAAs who raise protection claims at Australian airports from
the scope of art 31. 216 Second, UAAs who raise protection claims ‘are present in
[Australian] territory without authorization’, 217 as an airport on the Australian
mainland undoubtedly constitutes the state’s territory. 218 Where a protection
claim triggers a rejection of immigration clearance the Australian government
has not authorised the entry. erefore, UAAs who raise protection claims uniformly meet the ‘geographic and material scope’ 219 of art 31. ird, where an
individual raises a protection claim at or before immigration clearance at an
Australian airport, they undoubtedly can be said to raise the claim
‘without delay’. 220
Fourth, art 31 requires a person to show ‘good cause for [the asylum
seeker’s] illegal entry or presence’. 221 In general, ‘good cause’ may mean having
a well-founded fear of persecution, or coming directly from a country in which
the asylum seeker is at risk or where they do not have access to protection,
among other circumstances. 222 e reality that states have engaged in extensive
measures to restrict the travel options available to refugees and asylum seekers
also supports an understanding that ‘it should generally be accepted that they
have “good cause” for illegal entry or presence.’ 223 In the Australian context, the
restriction on an asylum seeker’s travel options holds especially true, due to the
multiple levels of screening and legal analysis imposed along the border continuum. 224 Moreover, the entry screening process and visa cancellation operate
to render asylum seekers arriving with a valid travel document and visa unlawful, thus creating the ‘illegal entry or presence’. 225 Understanding that UAAs fall
within the scope of art 31, this Part now considers whether three diﬀerent policies involving the exercise of Australia’s jurisdiction — namely visa
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225

1951 Convention (n 11) art 31(1).
Ibid.
See above nn 175–6 and accompanying text.
Legal and Protection Policy Paper, UN Doc PPLA/2017/01 (n 213) 23.
1951 Convention (n 11) art 31(1). See also ‘Roundtable on Non-Penalization’ (n 211) 6 [16].
1951 Convention (n 11) art 31(1).
Legal and Protection Policy Paper, UN Doc PPLA/2017/01 (n 213) 30–2, discussing ‘Summary
Conclusions: Article 31 of the 1951 Convention’ (n 215) 255–6.
Legal and Protection Policy Paper, UN Doc PPLA/2017/01 (n 213) 31.
See above Part II(A).
1951 Convention (n 11) art 31(1).
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cancellation, visa class restrictions, and detention — constitute penalties prohibited by the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol.
1 Visa Cancellation
As discussed above in Part II(B), a traveller who arrives at an Australian airport
with a visa and makes a protection claim at or before immigration clearance
may not be immigration cleared and subject to visa cancellation. is process
legally reconstitutes the traveller as a UAA and renders them ineligible to apply
for a permanent protection visa. e term ‘penalties’ is interpreted broadly to
include any kind of civil, criminal, or other ‘measure that has the eﬀect of being
disadvantageous’ 226 to refugees who fall within the scope of art 31, in light of
the object and purpose of the 1951 Convention. In addition to the views of the
UNHCR, the legislation and case law of many states also support this interpretation of ‘penalty.’ 227 For example, in 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada in
B010 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (‘B010’) held that ‘denying a
person access to the refugee claim process on account of ’ their illegal entry
constituted a ‘penalty’ under art 31(1). 228 By analogy, the administrative act of
cancelling the visa of an individual seeking protection in Australia on account
of a mismatch between the protection claim and the ‘purpose for the visa
grant’ 229 constitutes a penalty within the meaning of art 31(1). Visa cancellation
results in the traveller’s reclassification as an unlawful non-citizen, triggering
the government’s duty to remove the non-citizen ‘as soon as reasonably practicable’ 230 and without having regard to Australia’s non-refoulement obligations. 231 A circumstance in which the cancellation of an asylum seeker’s
226

227
228

229

230
231

Legal and Protection Policy Paper, UN Doc PPLA/2017/01 (n 213) 32. ough the French and
English texts of the 1951 Convention (n 11) use terms with dissimilar meanings, it is well-settled that the ‘meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose
of the treaty shall be adopted’: VCLT (n 47) art 33(4). Guy Goodwin-Gill, ‘Article 31: NonPenalization, Detention, and Protection’, in E Feller, V Turk, and F Nicholson (eds), Refugee
Protection in International Law (2003) 185, 194. e object and purpose of the Convention call
for the broader meaning inherent in the English-version of the term ‘penalty.’ Ibid.
Legal and Protection Policy Paper, UN Doc PPLA/2017/01 (n 213) 33.
[2015] 3 SCR 704, 731 [63] (McLachlin CJ). e impugned legislation had rendered the appellants ‘inadmissible’ due to engaging in ‘transnational crime’ including ‘people smuggling [and]
traﬃcking in persons’: at 719 [27], citing Immigration and Refugee Protection Act SC 2001, c 27
s 37(1)(b).
Protection Claims at the Border Instruction (n 27) 12. See also Ex parte Adimi (n 208) where
Simon Brown LJ observed that ‘the combined eﬀect of visa requirements and carriers’ liability
has made it well nigh impossible for refugees to travel to countries of refuge without false documents’: at 674.
Migration Act (n 15) s 198.
Ibid s 197C.
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underlying visa results in a legal classification that mandates removal without
regard to non-refoulement and without an examination of the refugee claim on
the merits, is the type of situation that art 31 was meant to prevent. 232
2 Visa Class Restriction
As with visa cancellation, restricting the class of protection visas available to
travellers refused immigration clearance in the entry screening process likely
constitutes a prohibited penalty. e government places this restriction on the
asylum seeker as a form of procedural disadvantage, based solely upon the individual’s immigration status at entry. 233 Once an asylum seeker has been refused immigration clearance and deemed to be a UAA, they are precluded from
accessing the permanent protection visa framework and allowed only to request a TPV or SHEV. 234 is penalty of visa class restriction goes beyond the
‘procedural detriment’ found to violate art 31 in B010 and in eﬀect renders the
asylum seeker ineligible to seek permanent protection from harm. is places
the individual in a precarious position where they may be subjected to refoulement when the temporary status expires. Indeed, the Australian government introduced the TPV and SHEV with the intent to deter and punish asylum seekers attempting to enter the country without a visa. 235 e punitive restriction of visa class, based solely upon the asylum seeker’s manner of entry
constitutes an impermissible penalty prohibited by art 31.
3 Detention
Article 31(2) prevents states from restricting the movements of refugees other
than where such restrictions ‘are necessary’. 236 Furthermore, any restrictions on
movement ‘shall only be applied until [the refugee’s] status in the country is
regularised or they obtain admission into another country’. 237 An inquiry into
whether detention violates the non-penalisation provision must therefore address the purpose, conditions, and duration of detention. In principle,
232

233
234
235

236
237

‘[O]nly if an individual’s claim to refugee status is examined before [they are] aﬀected by an
exercise of State jurisdiction (for example, in regard to penalization for “illegal” entry), can the
State be sure that its international obligations are met’: Goodwin-Gill, ‘Article 31 of the 1951
Convention Discussion Paper’ (n 208) 2 [4] (emphasis in original).
See above nn 87–9 and accompanying text.
Ibid.
See, eg, Migration and Maritime Powers Bill Explanatory Memorandum (n 10) 2:
e measures in this Bill are a continuation of the Government’s protection reform agenda
and make it clear that there will not be permanent protection for those who travel to Australia illegally.
1951 Convention (n 11) art 31(2).
Ibid.
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detention for administrative or investigative purposes does not constitute an
unnecessary restriction under art 31(2) or a penalty under art 31(1). However,
the question here is not whether administrative detention is generally allowed
under international law, but rather whether the purpose and conditions of detention in the Australian context of entry screening render detention impermissible under one or both sections of art 31. If the purpose of detention is
punitive, or an arbitrary or discriminatory restriction of rights under international refugee or human rights law, that detention may violate the provisions of
art 31. 238
A state may only resort to detention for a legitimate purpose, based upon ‘a
detailed and individualised assessment of the necessity to detain in line with a
legitimate purpose’. 239 Where the detention lacks protections against arbitrariness (including access to an eﬀective remedy to contest detention) or lacks individualised review, it violates substantive international legal safeguards against
unlawful and arbitrary detention. 240 erefore, even where a state has a legitimate, administrative purpose for detaining an asylum seeker — such as ‘[i]n
connection with accelerated procedures for manifestly unfounded or clearly
abusive claims’, 241 or ‘to carry out initial identity and security checks in cases
where identity is undetermined or in dispute, or there are indications of security risks’, 242 or even to record ‘within the context of a preliminary interview,
the elements of their claim to international protection’ 243 — the decision to detain must be based upon an individualised assessment of the asylum seeker’s
circumstances, subject to time limits.
Detention as mandated in the entry screening protocols does not conform
to these international legal standards. As outlined above in Part II, once an
238
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240
241
242
243

Guy S Goodwin-Gill, ‘Article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees:
Non-Penalization, Detention, and Protection’ in Erika Feller, Volker Türk and Frances Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 185, 195:
[T]he object and purpose of the protection envisaged by [a]rt 31(1) of the 1951 Convention
is the avoidance of penalization on account of illegal entry or illegal presence. An overly
formal or restrictive approach to defining this term will not be appropriate, for otherwise
the fundamental protection intended may be circumvented and the refugee’s rights withdrawn at discretion.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Detention Guidelines: Guidelines on the
Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives
to
Detention’
(Policy
Paper,
2012)
15
[19]
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/503489533b8.html> (‘Detention Guidelines’).
Ibid 15 [18]. See also ICCPR (n 11) art 9.
‘Detention Guidelines’ (n 239) 17 [23].
Ibid 17 [24].
Ibid 18 [28].
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asylum seeker has been refused immigration clearance they must be detained. 244 e decision to detain is automatic and mandated in all cases, without an examination of the need for detention in the individual case, rendering
the detention arbitrary. 245 Moreover, the decision to detain and conditions of
detention cannot be meaningfully challenged in court, due to both legal and
practical impediments. 246 ough the Australian government clearly has an interest in conducting initial identity and security checks, or recording elements
of a claim to international protection, the lack of individualised assessment,
combined with the lack of eﬀective remedy for contesting detention, renders
detention in the context of entry screening an arbitrary restriction of rights under international law. 247 is, in turn, constitutes an impermissible penalty under art 31.
V C O N C LU S I O N
ough the redacted release of several policy documents including the Entry
Screening Guidelines and the Protection Claims at the Border Instruction sheds
light on the intricacies of a process that has been relatively opaque, several key
questions remain. Perhaps foremost among them is the question of whether the
ABF follows the procedures outlined in the policy documents on a day-to-day,
operational basis. e number of individuals reported to have requested protection at Australian airports is remarkably low relative to the number of visa
cancellations in immigration clearance and at airports abroad. e policy documents mandate data collection, yet the DHA does not have procedures in
place to accurately capture and record that information. Data previously
244
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Protection Claims at the Border Instruction (n 27) 12–13.
‘Mandatory or automatic detention is arbitrary as it is not based on an examination of the
necessity of the detention in the individual case’: ‘Detention Guidelines’ (n 239) 16 [20]. See
also Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No 560/1993, UN Doc
CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (3 April 1997) 23–4 [9.4]:
[T]he fact of illegal entry may indicate a need for investigation and there may be other
factors particular to the individual … which may justify detention for a period. Without
such factors detention may be considered arbitrary, even if entry was illegal.
See above Part III. See also Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No 900/1999,
UN Doc CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999 (13 November 2002) 20 [8.3]:
[T]he court review available to the author was confined purely to a formal assessment of
the question whether the person in question was a “non-citizen” without an entry
permit … e Committee considers that an inability judicially to challenge a detention that
was, or had become, contrary to art 9, para 1, constitutes a violation of art 9, para 4.
ere are other international legal considerations which arise under the CRC (n 11) to which
Australia is a signatory. e CRC (n 11) directs that child detainment should only ‘be used as
a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time’: at art 37.
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provided by the DHA on airport protection claims is likely inaccurate. If the
agency does not know how many individuals have requested protection at Australia’s airports, there is no way to know whether Australia complies with its
domestic and international legal obligations.
In asking these questions, a larger picture emerges of a state that has located
migration decision-making in an enforcement-focused administrative legal
process, eschewing traditional rule of law principles such as transparency and
procedural fairness. Non-citizens who arrive at an Australian airport with a visa
and seek protection, but who are subsequently refused immigration clearance,
are labelled UAAs and legally reconstituted as outside of the migration zone.
is designation triggers an administrative entry screening process for the review of protection claims, which appears to find no legislative basis — or analogue — in the onshore protection framework. e entry screening process further appears to implicate a number of potential bases for legal challenge, including the right to access counsel and the right to visa application forms where
a non-citizen is detained, as well as the lack of review of entry screening decisions, the validity of the entry screening process under the Migration Act, and
the practical considerations that impede an individual’s ability to raise these
claims while detained at an airport.
Initiatives like oﬀshore processing, interdiction, and visa cancellations
abroad have persisted due, in part, to their occurrence far from Australian territory. However, the entry screening process locates these problematic practices
closer to home. Without an appropriate statutory basis for the operational exercise of the practice of entry screening, the policy is unlawful. If entry screening were to survive despite this fundamental defect, a variety of other domestic
legal considerations — including the lack of appropriate provisions to ensure
procedural fairness — would render the policy inoperable. e international
law implications are also significant and reveal a policy that likely violates Australia’s obligations of non-refoulement and non-penalisation, both in form and
operation. Rather than a case of border externalisation, entry screening represents an internalisation of fundamentally unfair and opaque procedures originally adopted to deter the protection claims of individuals far from the
Australian mainland.

